Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Supreme Court Case Files

Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers

10-1972

Rosario v. Rockefeller
Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Rosario v. Rockefeller. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 8. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Virginia.

This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme
Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

Court .... !=:A..-..2........ .

Voted on .. ..... ........... , 19 .. .

Argued .................. . , 19 .. .

Assigned ... . .............

No. 71-13 71

19 .. .

1 •,

I

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced ................ , 19 .. .

'-.../

PEDRO J. ROSARIO, ET AL., Petitioners

vs.
NELSON ROCKEFELLER, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, ET AL.

HOLD
FOR

Rehnquist, J.
Powell, J

0

0

0

0

0.

•••••

0

••••••••••

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.

0

0

•••

Blackmun, J ................. .
Marshall, J .................. .
White, J.

0

••••••••••

0

0

••••••••

JURISDICTIONAL
STATEMENT

NOT
VOT~~--~--~--~--~-+---.--+---.-_,
G
D SENT lNG
N
POST DIS
AFF
REV
AFF
0
D
CERT.

... :/'vi:..
.

0

-/.;;

'./ ........

. . . . . ... . ..

:1. ...... ..

.~ ....... .

Brennan, J ................... .

.V. ········

Burger, Ch. J

0

••••••••••••••••

AB-

••

Stewart, J ................... .
Douglas, J ................... .

MO'l'ION

MERITS

.//::::

•

•

,

••

0.

0

0

,

0

1

o

0

•

••

0.

0

0

•

••••••

0.

0

0

•••

0

••

•

•

•

0

•

~

•

0

•

•

•

•

•

0

0

•

0

••

0

0

•

0.

0

•

0

•

0

0

•

0

••••••

0

0

•

o

0

•

o

o

0

0

0

o

o

•

•••••

o

o

o

o

0.

o

o

o

0.

0

0

0

0

•

•

•

•

0

o

•••••••

o

o

o

o

•••••

0

0

•

•

•

•

o

0

o

•

o

•

••••••

o

•

o

o

0

0

0

••••

0

0

••

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

o

•

•

•••

o

•

o

0

•

•

o

•

.£lttttftmt Q}ou.rt of tlrt 'Jlhtittlt j)taka'Daa-ltingtttn. gl. <!}. 20,?'-t.,;t
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

April 26, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Re:

No. A-1126 (71-1371) - Rosario v. Rockefeller
Application for stay pending cert. to CA2

The attached memorandum which we have prepared
in this case might be of interest in considering the
application which has been referred by me to the full Court.

&
Attachment
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CHAMBERS OF

April 26, 1972

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

P~-

-~-~1er1,

~ 1/~

t.--U ~ I 17"'L-

No. A-1126 (71-1371)
Rosario v. Rockefeller - Application for stay pending cert. to CA2

..

Petitioners challenge the provision of New York's
......
election law that bars them from votin~ in t .h e N. Y. presidenti a l i)rimary on June 20, 1972.
Th~ p~ v~~~on defers
every re istration, for primary purposes only, until after
t e next eneral electlon.
Thus petitioners : who registered
to vote for the first time in December 1971, will not be
eligible to vote in a primary until after November 1972.
They claim this statute bears a heavy burden of justification, since it curtails the right t .o vote, and that it is
no.t narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest,
citing Dunn v. Blumstein.
They also claim it is in effect a
d~tional residence requirement, with respect to those people
who move into the state after a general election and before a
primary -- those people must wait out the prescribed time
(i.e., until after the next general election) before becoming
eligible to vote in a primary.
(But it does not appear that
any of the petitioners is in this category--it seems, though
it is not clear, t .ha t petitioners all belong to the class of
people who were in fact eligible to register in October, i.e.,
before the last general election, but who simply and inadvertently failed to do so.)

1

The DC agreed with petitioner and issued a declaratory
judgment striking the statute as unconstitutional.
The CA2
(Lumbard, Mansfield, Mulligan) reversed.
Petitioners have
filed their Petition for Writ of Certiorari and seek a stay
of the mandate pendi n g cert.
On the merits, petitioners have a substantial claim.
The only interest a qyanc >Q b y the state is the Q 6~ venti qp oY
c~ oss-o ~ r -fraud i n the primar1 es -- the idea is that people
have to declare their party affiliation for primary purposes

-2-

before the primary or the general election has gathered
steam -- indeed, they have to declare their party affiliation
prior to the next previous general election, which does not
at all involve the issues presented by the primary and its
associated general election. No doubt that is a valid state
interest.
But that interest is not at all served by a requirement that governs not only cross-overs, i.e., changes in party
af}ili~tion, ~also initial registrations, like petitioners'.
As applied to first-time voters, the statute s1mply means all
n~w voters ~ have to sit out one primar~ The statute thus curtails the r1ght of those new voters to vote in primaries, for
no apparent state interest at all.
If ~ourt

acts on the cert. p etition ~ ef~~ e
then the matter of the stay is unimportant; otherwise,
of course, it is critical, and should be granted (perhaps with
some special provision for keeping segregated the votes of the
voters whose eligibility is in question).
Ju~e._2 Q~

I

4/28/72

CEP

APPLICATION TO STAY THE MANDATE OF CA 2 PENDING ACTION ON
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
No. A"1126 OT 1971
Rosario

~·

(No. 71-1371)

Rockefeller

Cert to CA 2 (Lumbard, Mansfield & Mulligan)

~~v~\~~

Marshall has referred this stay application to the

tJf~ ~\

Conference, with a recommendation that the stay be granted.

(.

We have not yet received the moving papers; the only thing

/

we have is the attached memorandum.

The obvious solution

to this problem is to consider the petition for certiorari
before the end of May.

We have already received for

the May 12 Conference petitions numbered as high as 71-1283;
71 .. 1371 cannot be far off.

In any event, I agree with

Marshall 0 s recommendation that the stay be granted.
CEP

5/27/72

CEP

SUPPLEMENTAL ON RELISTING
No. 71-1371

JSCU

Rosario y. Rockefeller
Cert to CA 2 (Lumbard, Mansfield & Mulligan)
It seems to me that summary disposition is in the
offing.

You notes indicate that TM is to "report 11 on

this case.

His memo fully describing the case is

attached,
CEP

5/29/72

CEP

MEMORANDUM TO MR. JUSTICE POWELL
Rea

Rosario y. Rockefeller, No. 71-1371

While the opinion could be clearer, it is narrowly
written, and its result seems compelled by Dunn y.
stein,

You should join,

CEP

~

.:§u:pTemt <!J~urt ~f tlrt 'J!!ttitt~ ~tates

Jlas-4mghm. ~. QJ.
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CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUS TI <

May 29, 1972

Re: No. 71-1371 - Rosario v. Rockefeller

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

Byron White 1 s memorandum makes a fourth vote
(to grant cert) in the above case,which alters the
situation substantially. As a result o£ this Thurgood
has sent a message through Bill Brennan asking
that it not go on the Order List Tuesday. Meanwhile
Bill Rehnquist and I have been collaborating on a
dissent and would have it complete before five o'clock
today.
Thurgood's point-- and it is an important one -- is
the posture of the case in view o£ the granting of cert
and requests that a conference be held immediately
after the Tuesday sitting in order to consider what
action should be taken, if any.
Regards,

.ittJtftutt Qfltltrl 4tf tift 'J!britt~ .itwg
jlas£ringtMt. ~. <!f. 2DP:J.t..;l
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR.

May 29, 1972

/)

rio v. Rockefeller

Dear Thurgood:
Please join me in your Per Curiam.
I

Sincerely

Mr. Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference

)
I

5/29/72

CEP

MEMORANDUM TO MR. JUSTICE POWELL
Res Dunn y_, Blumstein
This case invelved Tennessee's durational residency
requirement,

There were two conditions to eligibility

to vote in Tennessee.

One was that you had to be a bona

fide resident of the state.

The other was that you had

to have been a resident for one year in the state and three
months in the county.

This latter condition was the

durational residency requirement; only its validity was
at issue.

It is undisputed that a requirement that a

prospective voter be a bona fide resident is constitutional.
The first part of the opinion deals with the standard
of review.

After extensive discussion, the Court concludes

that the exacting standard of equal protection review is
appropriate:

to withstand constitutional scrutiny, a

statute placing a condition on the right to vote must be
, necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest. (Em1
phasis in opinion), This standard is appropriate, the Court
concludes, because votli:.ng is a fundamental right" because
durational requirements impinge on the constitutional right
to travel,

The Court then notes that under this standard

of review, a heavy burden rests with the state to justify
the restriction, and the statute will be closely scrutinized in light of its asserted purpose.

The purpose

must be served by the least drastic means - the state must
further its interest by a means that least interferes
with constitutionally protected rights.

In other words,

the statute must be narrowly tailored to serve the state

interest, with the minimum

burden on the protected

possibl~

I

rights.
With respect to the offerred justification that the!
durational residency requirement maintained the purity
of the bal l ot box and prevented election fraud, the Court
held that the waiting period was not the least restrictive
means necessary for preventing fraud, noting that the criminal law could accomplish this purpose.
With respect to the offerred justification that the
durational r e sidency requirement was essential to assure
"knowledgable voters," the Court held that this device
was simply too crude to accomplish the goal.
In this case, the vice of the statute is that it
reaches too far.

In seeking to prevent "raiding" and

"cross-overs" by imposing its own "durational" requirement,
this statute denies the right to vote to people who are
incapable of crossing-over simply because they have never
before registered to vote(¢,"" beeav.se

..ft.~

I think that the case is clear.
in principle

from~.

Court will decide it.

jvs+ nwveJ hrb

4k. ..stllie-) .:

It is indistinguishable

You asked me, however, how the
That I cannot predict.

There has

been a disquieting tendency this Term to distinguish precedents on ephemeral grounds that have nothing to do with the
principles for which they stand.
Dunn.

This could happen to

White was in the Qgnn majority, and his adherence to

precedent in the area of voting law is minimal,

CEP
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS

January 4, 1973

Dear Chief:
As respects No. 71-1371,

~o~io

v. Rockefeller -- the opinion you assigned
to Potter -- I have talked with Lewis and
he vlill undertake the dissent.

lu&J

William 0. Douglas

The Chief Justice
cc:

Conference
Law Clerks

j

No. 71-1371 Rosario v. Rockefeller

Justices, has requested that I write the dissent in this case. ,
~s

this was one of your eases, I would appreciate your draft-

'
iDg a dissent - which you and I had in mind anyway.
fl..

is writing

~or

the Court.

~,

.

(;·

.§u.prtmt Qf!tttrt cf t4t 'Jttnittb .§taftg

2Jira:5frhtghm, ~. <q. 2!l~Jl·~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

January 8, 1973

Re:

No. 71-1371 - Rosario v. Rockefeller

Dear Potter:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference

~J

/

,Stt}trtttte <ronrt of t11c 'ltllitd~ ~ta~s
1

'J!Da!.l'Irhtgton, ~. ~· 2tl,(i'~;3

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

January lOJ 1973

Re:

No. 71-1371- ROSARIO v. ROCKEFELLER

Dear Potter:
Please join me.
SincerE!'lyJ

Mr. Justice Stewart
Copies to Conference

Memo to: Jay Wilkinson
From: Lewis F. Powell, ,J r.

January 10, 1973

Re: No. 71-1371 Rosario v. Rockefeller
These are a few random comments on Justice Stewart's
opinion, which I have just read rather hurriedly for the first time.
The opinion describes quite vaguely the alleged grounds
of unconstitutionality. At page 4 it states that petitioners rely on "their
right to vote" and abridgement of their "freedom to associate with the
political party of their choice." I have not looked at any of the authorities
recently, although I am generally familiar with Dunn and Carter. In Dunn,
a durational residence requirement was held invalid under the Equal Protection Clause -the class being persons who had moved into the state and
were caught by a one-year residence requirement. Also in Dunn, the
Court applied the compelling state interest test on the ground that a classification that interfered with the right to vote is "suspect."
Justice Stewart does not use equal protection analysis in his
opinion, although on page 5 he refers to the "class to which petitioner belongs"
as being "newly registered voters who were eligible to enroll in a party before
the previous general election."

-2He does not discuss - as I read his opinion - the issue as
to whether the test is compelling or simply rational basis. He is of course
keenly aware of what was held in Dunn, as he was with the majority. I have
been a bit puzzled as to why this question was not addressed specifically.
He does characterize the state's purpose as serving "an important state
goal," and as being "a legitimate and valid state goal. " (Page 9. )
I am personally not enthusiastic about extending the compelling
state interest test beyond the present scope of our decisions. It may be
that Dunn is- or fairly may be considered- controlling authority that where
the right to vote (including right to vote in a primary) is restricted- the
compelling interest test applies. I would prefer, however, to write this
case in that "intermediate zone" which we applied in Weber and Strange if we can conclude that this is a principled basis.
A few additional observations:
I agree with Justice Stewart (note 8) that petitioners lack
standing to raise the "right to travel" issue.
The gut issue - which prompted me to vote as I did - is
addressed by Justice Stewart on page 7: that the time limitation is so severe
as itself to constitute an unconstitutionally onerous burden on petitioners'
exercise of the right to vote. This period is eight months in a presidential
primary and eleven months in a non-presidential primary. I personally

-3see no reason, rational or otherwise, for such lengthy periods. Yet, I
have a reluctance to say that there is no rational basis for a law which
New York has had on its books for sixty years. I would recognize a
state interest in imposing reasonable limitations on party "cross-overs,"
but eight to eleven months preregistration provisions seem quite unreasonable.
I have not checked petitioners' briefs, but I hope they con-

tain information as to whether any other states have such onerous restrictions
on party registration. As you know, in Virginia we have none - and until
recently managed to get along fairly well. Virginia's experience the last
few years is, however, suggestive of the need for some sort of registration
law.
I wonder if the library here at the Court, or the Library of
Congress, would respond to an inquiry on my behalf for an analysis of
state election laws with respect to how far in advance of a party primary
must party affiliation be declared by registration.

L. F. P., Jr.

LFP, Jr. :pls
P. S. I have just looked at Justice Blackmun' s concurring opinion in Dunn
v. Bloomstein. It rather suggests that it is unnecessary to apply the compelling state interest test - although I am not entirely clear as to where his
opinion comes down.

(!}:curl of tfrt ~ttittb ..§f:attg
Jraslrhtghm. ~. (!}:. 20,?'!~

,Stqtrtutt

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

January 17, 1973

Re:

No. 71-1371 -

Rosario v. Rockefeller

Dear Potter:
Unless Lewis persuades me mightily to the contrary,
I am with you.
Sincerely,

;f.().~.
Mr. Justice Stewart

Copies to the Conference

/

/
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No. 71-1371 ROSARIO v. ROCKEFELLER
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
I

It is important at the outset to place New York's cutoff
'

~~
date for party enrollment in perspective. It prevents 1 d d b
~

voters from registering for a party primary i11i1i!J eight months
before a Presidential primary and eleven months before a non1
Presidential one.

The Court recognizes, as it must, that the

period between the enrollment deadline and the primary election
2

is a "lengthy" one.

Indeed, no other state has imposed upon

voters previously unaffiliated with any party restrictions which

.

3

evene approach in severity those of New York.

And New York

concedes that only one other state - Kentucky - , has imposed as
stringent a primary registration deadline on persons with prior
4

party affiliations.

Confronted with such a facially burdensome

2.
The right of all persons to vote, once the state has decided

J.-lv<-

to make it available to some, becomes a basic one under;1~
Constitution.

Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Kramer v.

Union Frre School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Carrington v.
Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).

Self-expression through the public ballot

~ ..e~ v( a-~~~<-<.'
equally with one's peers isJ:Pi8RUy tMflU~Htb in
· ts ::tstsh
~4(.
Reynolds v. Sims,

377

u. s.

,~~

533 ( 1964).

A lMM ~without a vote is to a large extent

Rider A, p. 2 (Rosario) 1/21/73

,.,,.ltoiJ~

Yet the Court today
~llnnte

J

•flfll 8\ 18

sf.f,J._

o..

tis 1 lh tt

Y••~rraidahry

which imposes substantial and unnecessary restrictions

on this right, as well as on the closely related right to associate
with the party of one's choice.

See Williams v. Rhoads, 393 U.s.

23 (1968); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); United states

e.~r-

v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967). The m&juiiy 8tJHd8R justifies this
holding by placing the responsibility upon petitioners for their
eight months

ri~t to as

35M.

•,

We are told l'Opoateelly that petitioners"clearly could have registered
and • • - • enrolled in the party of their choice" before the cutoff
date and been eligible to vote in the primary, but for undetermined
7'-e'~<

f

reasons "chose not td~ ,.{7and that their disenfranchisement~·--.,__
1\

e,n rollment.r

__.,.,.,.

agree.

e cutoff date were a less severe one, I could

Certainly, the state is justified in imposing a reasonable

regist r ation cutoff -

prior to any primary or general election,

~. ·~ ~ ~-j.~l .......... . (
beyond which a citizen's failure to register) i.s a negligen~

vv "-

'd.t

;.;,-~

forfeiting his right to vote in a particular election. But
b

se ·

d~t-.Jc p1""-<-tZ.~~ fe.t"SC.&.•.SI~C.
'Ia~
registration or party enrollment deadline eight

.,...~ J· c,..s t·• l"'nJ ,..oolillmi!ij~s~s.;.hiiniWjli_... ..
1

....

:~

A

, ifc
~ c.__. _,t~ ·r•~kt.

· l Ci cons t 1·t ut wna
·
l
; sg den1a
•

•. _

fc,

· ai:..fs. - I!
Flgn
4:m:rrAQ 1 a '

~
prior decisions impose on us the obligation to protect the

,._, ~

•
,;~ ..

4.
continuing availability of the franchise fqr all citizens, not to
sanction

;t.s prolonged infringement

d

.

t•

or epr1va wn.

j

•

Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 37 (1879), Nixon v. Herndon, 273

u.s.

536 (1927); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Baker v.

Carr, 369

u.s.

189 (1962); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963);

Rider A, p. 4 (Rosario) 1/21/73
tA.fJ'•~• ,.+I:J

majority accepts the state's contention that this is

I

6 [or 7]
disenfranchising

l

statute'~

as it does not absolutely

d. enfranchise petitioners or impose anJ absolute ba on their
lrreedom of association. It is true, of course, that the thrust of
/

a er th.

senfranchise altogether.

Yet deferment of a right, especially one as sensitive and essential
as the exercise of the firstynty of citizenship, can be serious
enough to equate denial.

The deferral, compelling registration

and chaise of party affiliation eight months or more in advance
of a primacy, can have an inhibitinp - indeed a disenfranchising
effect - on those who for q_uite legitimate reasons may wish to

)

5.

-

,
~ a&80C'i:atlon~

rights.

o." ..~~o/ ....te ~~c.e. c.
months on party enrollment and voting registration

dce.s
klili liln s'hPi8ttB

those who, for quite legitimate
reasons, decide to register.. closer than eight months to the
primary date and

•lilllilllil.~lil-,e

those who, for equally

legitimate reasons,
affiliation. Our decisions have never• required an absolute ban on
the exercise of constitutional rights before a constitutional breach
is incurred.

Rather, they have uniformly recognized that :s: a

serious burden or infringement on "

eo ... st;t~~-.11

protected activity"

is sufficient to establish a constitutional violation, Dunn v. -Blumstein,
supra at __, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 419, 438 (1963); Harper

v. Virginia Board of Elections, supra at __..., , for the @k ofdtbL

,

$J

Pte It:

6.
II

'J~ I /-~...(_

~r~ ~~standard of scrutiny
•

j '

The majority-fails to m.ake e
.

it apphes

t J.1.ANew Yor

~

~
• for part Y ent ollment
k~Bgthy
cutoff date
.s
We are told on 1y that the cutoff date 1

. . "not an arbitrary t.1me limit unc onnec ted to any important
. 1S
. "t"ed
al·"9that 1t
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But here the prior decisions of the Court hav-e firmly identified
the right to v-ote as fundamental in a constitutional sense, requiring
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party raiding.
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But this Court's prior decisions t simply

do not permit <111-aiMIII*- -IIJI..t such an approach.

Rather, they recognize

that:
" . . . the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter
in a free and democratic society. Especially since
the right to exercise the franchise in a free and
unimpaired manner is preservative of A:"ls• basic
civil and political rights, any alleged infringement
of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully
and meticulously scrutinized. Reynolds v. Sims,
supra, at 561- 562. See also Yick Wo v. Ho:PitiiiS,
118 u.s. 356 (1886).
Voting in a party primary is as protected against state
encroachment as voting in a general election. ..._Bullock v.
Carter, supra, at _ ; Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953);
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). And the Court has
said quite explicitly that "if a challenged statute

~s--~111•

grants

the right to vote to some citizens and denies the franchise to others,
'the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary
I It

to promote a compelling state interest~ Dunn v. Blumstein,
supra, at
supra, at 627.

(1972) quoting Kramer v. Union Free School District,
See also Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra, at

8.
704 (1969); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, supra, at 205, 209
I..;Jc•..,IS._/ •

(1970).
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right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political
beliefs" is "among our most precious freedoms" Williams v.
Rhodes,
from state encroachment. NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 449 (1958).
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Investigations Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
whether the instant statute,
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does.fb~t~tical rights,
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necessary to advance a compelling state interest.
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is lessened where, as in the case of petitioners, there has been

"
no previous affiliation with any political party.

The danger of

voters in sympathy with one party "raiding" another party is
~t.-<...o)~

insubstantial where the voter has declared no pr'evious expression

~~

t

pi' oA1. .
of party sympathy at all. Certainly, the danger falls short of the
4.(

compelling state interest needed to justify denying petitioners,
so far in advance, the right to declare an initial party affiliation
and vote in the party primary of their choice.

11.
III

In

~'

supra, at __, the Court emphasized that the

state, in pursuing* its legitimate interests,d'

a

•cannot chose means which unnecessarily burden or
restrict constitutionally protected activity. ·. · Statutes
affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with
'precisio~ NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 419, 438
(1963 ); Un1ted States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265
(1967), and must be 'tailored' to serve their
legitimate objectives. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra,
394 U.S. at 631. And if there are other, reasonable
ways to achieve these goals with a lesser burden on
c onstitutionally4" protected activity, a State may not
choose the way of greater interference. If it acts
at all, it must choose'less drastic means. •' •
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
The Court states that placing the enrollment deadline before
the preceding general election serves well the state interest in
-1-t.J a.~~

12

discouraging party "raiding. "

This

fails Ml-ffill~~,

1.-

-to-question

I

whether that interest may be adequately protected by less severe
measures.

A foreshortening of the challenged period in this

case would not leave the party structure of New York helpless and
vulnerable to "raiding" activities.

The other states, with varied

and complex party systems, have well maintained them without
the advanced enrollment deadline imposed by New Yorfi::j/Political

12.
activities do not constantly engage the attention of Arne ricans.
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manageable probleiiJ What is most important, a "less drastic"

for legitimate party participation to those who. constitutionally
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FOOTNOTES

1. October 2, 1971, was the last day on which petitioners' enrollment

could have been effective. June 20, 1972, was the date of New York's
presidential primary. Thus the deadline was actually some eight and
one-half months before the primary. In non-presidential years, the
cut-off runs from early October until the following September.

2. Court opinion, p. 8.

3. The state does not dispute this point. See Tr. of Oral Arg. , p. 34.
I

,. ri..

, r._

~---j

4 . Tr. of Oral Arg. , p. 34 .

•.

-2-

5. Court opinion, pp. 5, 6. See also p. 10 where the Court refers
to section 186 as merely imposing "a legitimate time limitation
on their (petitioners') enrollment, which they chose to disregard."

6. See the Court's opinion at p. 5:

Similarly at p. 6:
.

I

and p. 10:

In all these instances, the majority seeks to distinguish what it
chooses to call a mere "time limitation" from an absolute disenfranchisement of petitioners or an absolute ban on their associational
rights.

7 . Tr. of Oral Arg. , p. 3 5.

8. Court opinion, p. 7.

-3-

9. Court opinion, p. 8.

10

o

Id. p. 9.

11. Tr. of Oral Arg. p. 29.
12. Court Opinion, p. 9.
13.

I.

Petitioners also suggest other "less drastic" means of protecting

the state's interest: greater reliance on the summary dis enrollment
p rocedures of Section 332 of the State's election law and loyalty oaths,
restrictive party affiliation rules optional for those parties who wish
them, limitation of the statute's operation to persons with preexisting
party affiliations, and criminal sanctions for fraudulent participation
in the electoral process.

Tr. of Oral Arg. pp. 13-21. I made no

judgment either on the efficacy of these alternatives in protecting the
state's interest or on their potential infringement of constitutionally
protected rights.

Their presence, however, points to the range and

variety of other experimental techniques which might be less destructive
of constitutional rights.

'

'
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Yet the Court today approves the New Yorlt statutory
scheme which imposes substantial and unnecessary restrictions
on this right, as well as on the closely related right to associate
with the party of one's choice. See Williams v. Rhoads, 393 U. S.
23 (1968); NAA'2_!' v.

Ala~ma,

•

357 U.s. 449 (1958); United States

v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967). The majority opinion justifies this
holding by placing the responsibility upon petitioners for their
failure to enroll, as permitted by New York law, eight months
prior to the presidential primary.
(Note to .Jay: I am not sure that this rider is expressed
iil"tiie best possible way. It is a substitute for the first
sentence in the paragraph beginning at the bottom of
page 2, which seems to me to require a revision. Perhaps
you can come up with a better alternative.)

!!!<!er &_ p. 4 (Hosario) 1/21/73

The majority accepts the state's contention that this is
6 [or 7]

"not a disenfranchising statute"

as it does not absolutely

disenfranchise petitioners or impose any absolute ban on their
freedom of association. It is true, of course, that the thrust of
the statute is to postpone rather than disenfranchise altogether.
Yet deferment of a right, especially one as sensitive and essential
as the exercise of the first duty of citizenship, can be serious
enough to equate denial. The deferral, compelling registration
and choise of party affiliation eight months or more in advance
of a primary, can have an inhibiting- indeed a disenfranchising
effect - on those who for quite legitimate reasons may wish to
defer choosing or changing their party affiliation.

Rider A, p. 6 (Rosario) 1/21/73

I

This language resembles, though the terminology is somewhat
stronger, the traditional equal pxtowx protection "rational basis"
test. In some cases

Jlirli!ICe

we have elected, where dealing with

state action not previously identified with either of the frequently
applied standards, to judge the validity of a challenged act or
classification without categorizing the standard or test applied.*
But here the prior decisions of the Court have firmly identified
the right to vote as fundamental in a constitutional sense, requiring
the applicability of strict judicial review:

*Jay: -Cite Fmes v. Strange, Weber and the Harvard Law Review
article discussing the intermediate type standard.

.

...

,~i

TO:
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Wilk~son,
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~ Lewis F~J~ Powell, Jr.
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71-1371 Rosario v. Rockefeller

Sally will deliver to you your first draft, which I have reviewed
rather hurriedly today. I did not have an opportunity to take a look at it
previously.
1I have suggested some tentative changes, including several :kiida::ia:
~~

~

viewpoint of style and clarity. ,J. have not undertaken to do this either,
~fl:o+~ ·'I!'~.'"

·~-~'in

view of pressures of my getting off to Delray.

,1•. Constitutional violation. Nowhere do we specifically identify
~.

the constiutional violation . ., ~s it equal protection or due process or
something else? You and I discussed, briefly, whether this was an equal
protection case, and - if so - how does one identify the disadvantaged
class.?, .
v>~
,,j~

~-

,.I have not had time to reexamine the briefs or the opinion below
-~

~-

3.
now being applied by the Court, namely, strict sbdiny where a fundamental
right or a suspect class is involved, and only the need for some rational
basis in other situations.
My suggested rider on page 6 moves cautiously into this area.
Justice stewart may well be trying to occupy the middle ground identified
by Prof. Gunther. I personally like the middle ground and do not want to
mold deeper into "concrete" the present dichotomy between the two
establis,H~d

standards. See what you can do with a footnote as well as

the text on page ·6 that would tie in with the Gunther article idea, leaving
our options open. In this. case, we are bound by precedent to apply the
strict standard test. My thought is that we migtlt simply - in a note indicate that the two prevailing tests need not always be applied,
demonstrated in James v. strange and Weber.

*****
My suggestion is that you make such revisions,
pblishing as you think necessary. Then have the printer do a half a
dozen "chambers copies" of a first draft, and mail it to me airmail.
I will then clear it with you on the telephone,
irculate during my absence.
I think you have done a splendid piece of work, especially considering
the handicap of your illness.

''

I

'

2.

as being involved in the case, without making it at all clear as to what

,~

' section of the Constitution is violated.
I think the analysis in our opinion should be more specific.
would guess that a reexamination of some of the prior precedents would
''"h

., give you appropriate guidance.~ This is not a major revision task, but "'
merely one of identification.
"'..'[.':.

2. Judge Lumbard's opinion. As you know, Judge Lumbard is
, _.
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-J01'"''i-'

.
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~- ~·
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.;,., widely regarded .as ,one of the 'ablest judges in-the country. tAs we would
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.( reverse his opinion, ;I would like - at least -to address fairly the
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.
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arguments 'if~'!lhlakes. ;;:You might reread his opinion and consider what
...;Jf\~~~. ~~'-:ij,.

-~J
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additions, if any, should

oo ~ make
~

'

to

~~

ours~ ·
l,lli~

I thin~-~ :l:a~~j~'' you should note - perli~~s in ui·~ . Section of our .
opinion discussing the failure of Justice stewart to identify the applicable
~·

standard - that

I
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Lumbard assumes that the· ' ~compelling state interest"
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test must be applied. He then goes on to find that New York's interest
' is compelling! 1I know of no precedent for such a finding, and wonder
~t

l

'!"o~<'ll

whether he has cited any.
•t-

~

You directed my attention
[:\'

:J'!f-'

to Professor Gunther's analysis in the November Harvard Law Review,
in which he commented favorably on what he perceived to be a trend

away from the

rhaps artificiality of the two standards
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York, et al.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
]

It is important at the outset to place New York's cutoff date for party enrollment in perspective. It prevents
prospective voters from registering for a party primary
some eight months before a presidential primary and 11
months before a nonpresidential one. 1 The Court recognizes, as it must, that the period between the enrollment and the primary election is a "lengthy" one. 2 Indeed, no other State has imposed upon voters previously
unaffiliated with any party restrictions which even approach in severity those of New York. 3 And New York
1 October 2, 1971, was the last day on which petitioners' enrollment
could have been effective. June 20, 1972, was the date of New York's
presidential primary. Thus tho deadline was actually some eight
and one-half months before tho primary. In nonpre~idential year~,
tho cutoff runs from early October until the following September.
~ Court opinion, p. 8.
3 The State does not dispute this point. See Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 34.
Massachusetts, Illinois, Ohio, New Jersey, and TC'xas permit proYiously unaffiliated voters to declare their initial party affiliation
immediately prior to voting in the primary of their choice. See
Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, c. 53,§§ 37, 38; Illinois Annotated
Statutes, §§ 5-30; 7-43-7-45; New Jersey Statute;; Annotated,

)
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concedes that only one other State-Kentucky-has imposed as stringent a primary registration deadline on
persons with prior party affiliations.' Confronted with
such a facially burdensome requirement, I find the Court's
opinion unconvincing.
The right of all persons to vote, once the State has
decided to make it available to some, becomes a basic
one under the Constitution. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U. S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School District,
395 U. S. 621 (1969); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89
( 1965). Self-expression through the public ballot equally
with one's peers is the essence of a democratic society.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 r. S. 533 (1964). A citizen without a vote is to a large extent one without a voice in
decisions which may profoundly affect him and his family.
Whatever his disagreement may be with the judgments
of public officials, the citizen should never be given just
cause to think that he was denied an equal right to
elect them.
Yet the Court today upholds a statute which imposes
substantial ancl unnecessary restrictions on this right,
as well as on the closely related right to associate ,...-ith
the party of one's choice. Sec Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U. S. 23 ( 1968); XAA CP "· Alabama, 357 U. S. 449
Hl::2:3-45; Vrrnon'~ Annolatrd Trxa~ StatutrH, Tit. 9, Art. 1:3.01a;
Ohio Rrvisrd Codr, § 351:3.19.
California and Pcnn~ylvania prrmit prrviou~ly unafliliatccl vot rr~
to drdarc an initial part.1· prrfcrenrc \Ill to the c!o~c of rrp;i~tration
immrdiatel~· prerrding thr primar~·. Califomia Election CoclP, §§ :22,
20:3, :311-:312 (rrp;i::;tration do~r~ in California 53 cla~·~ bPforP a
primar~·); Purdon'~ Prnn,:~·Ivania Statutr~ AnnotatPd. Tit. 25, §§ 291
et seq. (rPp;i~tration do~<'~ in J'pnn~~· Ivnnia 50 days before a
primm·~·).

:\Jirhip;an permit~ an~· registered voter to pnrtirip;1 te in the priof his rhoirP. l\Iirhignn Compiled Laws Annotated,§§ 161'.570,
l()S.575-16S.576. Sre Petitioner~' Brief, pp. 32-33.
' Tr. of Ornl Arg., p. 34.
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(1958); United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967) .
The Court justifies this holding by placing the responsibility upon petitioners for their failure to enroll, as
required by New York law, eight months prior to the
presidential primary. We are told that petitioners
"clearly could have registered and enrolled in the party
of their choice" before the cutoff date and been eligible
to vote in the primary, but for undetermined reasons
"chose not to," and that their disenfranchisement resulted from "their own failure to take timely steps to
effect their enrollment." "
If the cutoff date were a less severe one, I could agree.
Certainly, the State is .i ustified in imposing a reasonable
registration cutoff prior to any primary or general election, beyond which a citizen's failure to register may be
presumed a negligent or wilful act forfeiting his right
to vote in a particular election. But it is difficult to
perceive any persuasive basis for a registration or party
enrollment deadline eight to 11 months prior to election.
Failure to comply with such an extreme deadline can
hardly be used to justify denial of a basic constitutional
right. Numerous prior decisions impose on us the obligation to protect the continuing availability of the franchise for all citizens, not to sanction its prolonged deferment or deprivation. E.x parte Siebold, 100 U. S.
37 (1879); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 5,35 (1927); Lane
v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
189 (1962); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368 (1963);
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v.
Sims, supra; Carrington v. Rash, supra; Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966); Kramer
v. Union Free School District, supra; Cipriano v. City
5 Court opinion, pp. 5, 6.
Sec also p. 10 where the Court refcro;
to § 186 a1:1 merely imposing "<t legitimate I ime limitation on their
rpctitioner::>' 1 enrollment, which they chose to di~regard."
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of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Evans v. Cornman, 398
U. S. 419 (1970); City of Phoenix v. Kolod.ziejski, 399
U.S. 204 (1970); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972);
Dunn v. Blumstein, supra.
The majority excuses the challenged statute because
it does not "absolutely" disenfranchise petitioners or impose any absolute ban on their freedom of association. 6
The State likewise contends this is "not a disenfranchismg statute." 7 The Court apparently views this statute as postponing rather than denying altogether petiH See the Court's opinion, at p. 5:
"Section 186 of Nrw York'8 Election Law, however, is quite different.
It did not absolutely disenfranchise tho class to which the petitioners
belong-newly regi8tered voters who were eligible to enroll in a
party before the previous general election. Rather, the statutes
merely imposed a time deadline on their enrollment, which they had
to meet in order to participate in the next primary."
Similarl~r at p. 6:
"The petitioners do not say why they did not rnroll prior to the
cutoff date, but it is clear that they could have done so, but chose
not to. Hence, if their plight can be charartrrizrd as di,;enfranchisemcnt at all, it was not caused by § 186, but by their own failure to
take timely steps to effect their enrollment.
"For the same reason, wr reject the petitioners' argument that § 186
violated their First and Fourthteenth Amendment right of free association with the political party of their choice. Since they could
have enrolled in a party in time to participate in the June 1972
primary, § 186 did not constitute a ban on their freedom of association, but merely a time limitation on when they had to act in order
to participate in their chosen party's next primary."
And p. 10:
"New York did not prohibit the petitioners from voting in the 1972
primary election or from associating with the political party of their
choice. It merely imposed a legitimate time limita,tion on their
enrollment, which they chose to disregard."
In a.ll these instances, the majority seeks to distinguish a "time limitation" from an absolute disenfranchisement of petitioners or an
absolute ban on their associational rights.
7 Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 35.
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tioners' voting and associational rights. 8 I cannot agree.
Deferment of a right, especially one as sensitive and
essential as the exercise of the first duty of citizenship,
can be tantamount to its denial. And any statute which
imposes for eight or 11 months an absolute freeze on
party enrollment and the consequent right to vote does
disenfranchise those who, for quite legitimate reasons,
decide to register closer than eight months to the primary
date and those who, for equally legitimate reasons, wish
to c 1ang or alter party affiliation. Our decisions, how~::_.5z.._-e;;v;-;,e~r:-,]:h;-::a~v;;;:e never required a permanent ban on the exercise
of voting and associational rights before a constitutional
breach is incurred. Rather, they have uniformly recognized that a serious burden or infringement on such
"constitutionally protected activity" is sufficient to establish a constitutional violation, Dunn v. Blumstein, supra,
at 343; NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 419, 438 (1963);
Reynolds v. Sims, supra, at 561-562, f t e reason
ti.a
s ~@.I as
II

The majority does not identify the standard of scrutiny it applies to the New York statute. We are told
only that the cutoff date is "not an arbitrary time limit
unconnected to any important state goal"; 9 that it is
"tied to a particularized legitimate purpose and is in no
sense invidious or arbitrary." 10 The Court does not
explain why this formulation was chosen, what precedents
support it, or how and in what contexts it is to be applied. Such nebulous promulgations are bound to leave
the lower courts and state legislatures in doubt and con" Court opinion, p. 7.
"Court opinion, p. 8.
10
I d., p. 9.
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fusion as to how "·e will approach future significant burdens on the right to vote and to associate freely with the
party of one's choice.
The Court's formulation, though the terminology is
somewhat stronger, resembles the traditional equal protection "rational basis" test. One may agree that the
challenged cutoff date is rationally related to the legitimate interest of K ew York in preventing party "raiding."
But this Court's prior decisions simply do not permit
such an approach. Rather, they recognize that:
" ... the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter
in a free and democratic society. Especially since
the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil
and political rights, any alleged infringement of the
right of citizens to vote must be carefully and
Ineticulously scrutinized." Reynolds v. Sims, supra,
at 561-562.
Sec also Yick TVo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886).
Voting in a party primary is as protected against state
encroachment as voting in a general election. Bullock
Y. Carter, supra; Terry \'. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953);
United States v. Classic, 313 r. S. 299 (1941). And the
Court has E"-aid quite explicitly that "if a challenged statute grants the right to vote to some citizens and denies tlle
franchise to others. 'the Court must determine whether
the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling
state interest.'" Dunn , .. Blumstein, supra, at 337
(1972), quoting Kramer v. Union Free School District,
supra, at G27. Sec al~o Cipn'ano Y. City of Houma, supra,
at 704 (1969); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, supra,
at 205, 209 (1970). Like\vise, the Court has asserted
that "the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs" is "among our most
precious freedoms," Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S., supm,
30-31 ( 1968). and must be carefully protected fron1 state
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encroachment. 1YAA CP Y. Alabama, supra, at 449
(1958); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigations Committee, 372
U. R. 539 ( 1963).
The inquiry thus becomes \vhether the instant statute,
burdening as it docs fundamental political rights, is necessary to advance a compelling state interest. The asserted state interest in this case is the prevention of party
"raiding." which consists of the movement or "cross-over"
by members of one party into another's primary to
"defeat a candidate who is adverse to the interests they
care to advance."" The typical example is a member
of one party deliberately entering another's primary to
help nominate a weaker candidate, so that his O\vn party's
nominee might win more easily in the general election.
A tate docs have an interest in preventing such behavior, lest "the efficacy of the party system in the
democratic process-its usefulness in providing a unity
of divergent factions in an alliance for power-be seriF. 2d ously impaired,'' Rosario v. Rockefeller, (CA2). The court below held flatly that the state interest in deterring "raiding" was a "compelling" one.
!d., a t - .
The matter, however, is not so easily resolved. The
compelling nature of any such interest cannot be determined in a vacuum, but rather in the context of the
means advanced by the State to protect it and the constitutionally sensitive activity it operates to impede.
The state interest here is hardly compelling enough to
sustain the presumption, upon >vhich the statute appears _
to be based, that .aJ{j)ersons wfio change or declare party
affiliation nearer than eight to 11 months to a party
primary do so with intent to raid that primary. Any
such presumption assumes a willingness to manipulate
the system which is not likely to be widespread.
1

'

Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 29.
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Political parties in this country traditionally have been
characterized by a fluidity and overlap of philosophy and
membership. And citizens generally declare or alter
party affiliation for reasons quite unconnected with any
premeditated intention to disrupt or frustrate the plans
of a party with which they are not in sympathy. Citizens customarily choose a party and vote in its primary
simply because it presents candidates and issues more
responsive to their immediate concerns and aspirations.
Such candidates or issues often are not lil.i;,pa+~ eight to
11 months before a primary. That a citizen s ould be
absolutely precluded so far in advance from voting in a
party primary in response to a sympathetic candidate,
a new or meaningful issue, or changing party philosophies
in his State, runs contrary to the basic rights of personal
choice and expression which voting in this country was
designed to serve.
Whatever state interest exists for preventing crossovers from one party to another is appreciably lessened
where, as in the case of petitioners, there has been no
previous affiliation with any political party. The danger
of voters in sympathy with one party "raiding" another
party is insubstantial where the voter has made no prior
party commitment at all. Certainly, the danger falls
short of the compelling state interest needed to justify
denying petitioners, so far in advance, the right to declare
an initial party affiliation and vote in the party primary
of their choice.
III
In Dunn, supra, at 343, the Court emphasized that the
State, in pursuing its legitimate interest,
"cannot choose means which unnecessarily burden or
restrict constitutionally protected activity. Statutes
affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with
'precision' NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 419, 438
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(1963); United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 265
( 1967), and must be 'tailored' to serve their legitimate objectives. Shapiro v. 'Thompson, supra, 394
U. S., at 631. And if there are other, reasonable
ways to achieve these goals with a lessser burden on
constitutionally protected activity, a State may not
choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at
all, it must choose 'less drastic means.' " Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960).
The Court states that placing the enrollment deadline
before the preceding general election serves well the
state interest in discouraging party "raiding." 12 This
fails to address the critical question of whether that interest may be protected adequately by less severe measures.
A foreshortening of the challenged period in this case
would not leave the party structure of New York helpless
and vulnerable to "raiding" activities. Other States, with
varied and complex party systems, have maintained them
successfully without the advanced enrollment deadline
imposed by New York.
Political activities do not constantly engage the attention of Americans. Many citizens do not even vote:
far fewer subtly calculate to enter another party's primary to affect adversely that party's interest, especially
in a day when party labels and loyalties generally are
said to hold less sway over voters. To the extent that
"raiding" does occur, it is
o ten a last-min~u~t~e;iji~m~--~=.-j~...,.IC:II""fG::p!!l:~~
pulsive phenomenon. It is ~ unlikely that a1 mg
deadline to one or wo mon
in advance of a primary. Organizing "raiding" activity
before such a deadline in the face of voter inertia still
would be a difficult task. Though a shortened enrollment deadline may not screen out every "raider" that
'"Court opinion, p. 9.
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the present deadline does, "raiding" would remain a manageable problem and political parties would maintain
their distinctive character. What is most important, a
"less drastic" enrollment deadline would make the fran-·
chise and opportunities for legitimate party participation
available to those who constitutionally have the right to.
exercise them. 13

13 Petitioners also suggest other "less drastic" means of protecting
the State's interest: greater reliance on the summary disenrollment
procedures of § 332 of the State's election law and loyalty oaths,
restrictive party affiliation rules optional for those parties who wish
them, limitation of the statute's operation to persons with preexisting party affiliations, and criminal sanctions for fraudulent participation in the electoral process. Tr. of Oral Arg., pp. 13-21. I
make no judgment either on the efficacy of these alternatives in
protecting the State's interest or on their potential infringement of
con~titutionally protected rights. Their presence, however, points
to the range and variety of other experimental technique:; available
for New York to comider.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
I

It is important at the outset to place New York's cutoff date for party enrollment in perspective. It prevents
prospective voters from registering for a party primary
some eight months before a presidential primary and 11
months before a nonpresidential one. 1 The Court recognizes, as it must, that the period between the enrollment and the primary election is a "lengthy" one. 2 Indeed, no other State has imposed upon voters previously
unaffiliated with any party restrictions which even approach in severity those of New York. 3 And New York
October 2, 1971, was the ln ~t clay on which petitioners' enrollment
could haYe brrn effective. June 20, 1972, wa s the date of New York's
prPSidential primary. Thus the deadline wns actunlly somr eio-ht
and one-half months before the primary. In nonpreRi.drntinl yr~rs,
the cutoff runs from early October until the following Srptcmbcr.
2
Court opinion, p. 8.
3
The State docs not dispute this point. Src Tr. of Oral A rg. , p. 34.
Massachusetts, Illinois, Ohio, New ,Terscy, and Texas permit preYiously unaffiliated voters to declare their initial part~· affiliation
immediately prior to voting in the primary of their choice. See
Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, c. 53,§§ 37, 38; Illinois Annotated
Statutes, §§ 5-30; 7-43- 7-45; New Jersry Statutrs Annotatrd,
1
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concedes that only one other State-Kentucky-has imposed as stringent a primary registration deadline on
persons with prior party affiliations. 4 Confronted with
such a facially burden!':ome requirement. I find the Court's
opinion unconvincing.
The right of all persons to vote, once the State has
decided to make it available to some, becomes a basic
one under the Constitution. Dunn v. Blums.tein, 405
U. S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School Dislrict,
395 U. S. 621 (1969); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89
(1965). Self-expression through the public ballot equally
with one's peers is the essence of a democratic society.
Reynolds v. S·ims, 377 r. R. 533 (1964). A citizen without a vote is to a large extent one \\'ithout a voice in
decisions \Yhich may profoundly affect him and his family.
Whatever his disagreement may be \Yith the judgments
of public officials. the citizen should never be given just
cause to think that he was denied an equal right to·
elect them.
Yet the Court today upholds a statute 1\'hich imposes
substantial and unnecessary restrictions on this right,
as well as on the closely related right to associate with
the party of one's choice. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U. S. 23 (1968); NAACP "· Alabama, 357 U. S. 449
10:2:)-4.5; Vernon',.; Annotated Texas Statute,, Tit. 0, i\rt. n.Ol:t;
Ohio Revised Code, § :351:3.19.
California. and Prnn,.;~·Jynnin prrmit l1l'C'\' iou"l~· unnffilintrd Yot\'n.;
to clrdarc an initial p:1rt~· prrfc•rrnrr np to thr do"r of rrgi~tration
immrcli:ttely prr<"C'ding thr primar~·. Ca li fomin Elrction Cod<•, §§ 22,
2m, :311-312 (rrgi~trntion do"r~ in C:difornia 5::1 cln~·" lwfnrr a
primar~· ); Purdon':,; Prnn,~·IY:Illia Statntr" Annotntrd , Til. 2.'), §§ 201
l't seq. (rrgi,;trntion rlo~es in Penn~~·ln1nia 50 d:1~·~ bdorr a
primnry) .
\firhigan prrmits an~' rrg;i~trrrd Yotrr to partiripatr in thr prirn:n·~· of his choicr. ?llirhig;an Compiled Law" :\nnotatrcl, §~ 16S.510,
1G8.1'i75-158.575. Srr Prtit ionN~' Brirf, pp. 3:2-33.
" Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 34.
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(1958); United Slates Y. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967).
The Court justifies this holding by placing the responsibility upon petitioners for their failure to enroll, as
required by New York law, eight months prior to the
presidential primary. We are told that petitioners
"clearly could have registered and enrolled in the party
of their choice" before the cutoff date and been eligible
to vote in the primary, but for undetermined reasons
"chose not to," and that their disenfranchisement resulted from "their own failure to take timely steps to
effect their enrollment." 5
If the cutoff date were a less severe one, I could agree.
Certainly. the State is justified in imposing a reasonable
registration cutoff prior to any primary or general election, beyond ·which a citizen's failure to register may be
presumed a negligent or wilful act forfeiting his right
to vote in a particular election. But it is difficult to
perceive any persuasive basis for a registration or party
enrollment deadline eight to 11 months prior to election.
Failure to comply with such an extreme deadline can
hardly be used to justify denial of a basic constitutional
right. Numerous prior decisions impose on us the obligation to protect the continuing availability of the franchise for all citizens, not to sanction its prolonged deferment or deprivation. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S.
37 (1879); Ni.&on v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Lane
v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
189 (1962); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368 (1963);
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v.
Sims, supra; Carrington v. Rash, supra; Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966); Kramer
v. Union Free School District, supra; Cipriano v. City
5

Court. opinion, pp. 5, 6. See nlcio p. 10 where the Court refers
to § 186 as mrrel.1· imposing " a lrgitimatr t imr limitation on their
[petitioners'l enrollment, which they cho~c to di~rrgarcl."
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of Houma, 395 U. S. 701 (1969); Evans v. Cornman, 393·
U. S. 419 (1970); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399
U.S. 204 (1970); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972);
Dunn v. Blumstein, supra.
The majority excuses the challenged statute because
it does not "absolutely" disenfranchise petitioners or impose any absolute ban on their freedom of association. 6
The State likewise contends this is "not a disenfranchising statute." 7 The Court apparently views this statn Sre

the Court's opinion, at p. 5:
"Section 186 of New York's Election Law, however, i8 quite different ..
H did not absolutely disenfmnchisc the clas::; to which the petitioners
brlong-newly rrgi::;tered voters who were eligible to enroll in a
party before the previous general election. Rather, the statutes·
merely imposed a time dcndlinc on their enrollment, which thry had
to meet in order to pnrticipatc in the next primary."
Similarly at p. 6:
"The prtitionrrs do not say why they did not rnroll prior to thecutoff elate, but it is clrar that the? could have clone so, but chose
not to. Hence, if their plight can be characterized aR disenfranchisemrnt at nil, it was not rausrd by § 186, but by their own failure to
take timely steps to effect their enrollment.
"For the same reason, we rrjcct the petitioners' argumrnt that § 186
viola ted their First and Fourthtcenth Amendment right of free association with the political party of their choice. Since they could
have enrolled in a party in time to participate in the June 1972
primary, § 186 did not constitute a ban on their frerdom of association, but merely a time limitation on when they had to act in order
to participate in their chosen party's next primary."
And p. 10:
"New York did not prohibit the petitioners from voting in the 1972
primary election or from associating with the political party of their
choice. It merely imposed a legitimate time limitation on their
enrollment, which they chose to disregard."
In nll these instnnccs, the majority seeks to distinguish a "time limitation" from an ab::;olutc disenfranchiscment of petitioners or an
nbsolute ban on their as~ociational rights.
7 Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 35.
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ute as postponing rather than denying altogether petitioners' voting and associational rights. 8 I cannot agree.
Deferment of a right, especially one as sensitive and
essential as the exercise of the first duty of citizenship,.
can be tantamount to its denial. And any statute which
imposes for eight or 11 months an absolute freeze on
party enrollment and the consequent right to vote does
disenfranchise those who, for quite legitimate reasons,
decide to register closer than eight months to the primary
date and those who, for equally legitimate reasons, wish
to choose or alter party affiliation. Our decisions, however, have never required a permanent ban on the exercise
of voting and associational rights before a constitutional
breach is incurred. Rather, they have uniformly recognized that a serious burden or infringement on such
"constitutionally protected activity" is sufficient to estab-·
lish a constitutional violation , Dunn v. Blumstein, supra,.
at 343; NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 419, 438 ( 1963);
Reynolds v. Sims, supra, at 561-562.
II

The majority does not identify the standard of scrutiny it applies to the New York statute. We are told
only that the cutoff date is "not an arbitrary time limit
unconnected to any important state goal"; 9 that it is
"tied to a particularized legitimate purpose and is in no
sense invidious or arbitrary." 1 0 The Court does not
explain why this formulation was chosen, what precedents
support it, or how and in what contexts it is to be applied. Such nebulous promulgations are bound to leave
the lower courts and state legislatures in doubt and confusion as to how we will approach future significant bur-·
Court opinion, p. 7.
opinion, p . 8.
1U !d., p. 9.

8
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dens on the right to vote and to associate freely with the
party of one's choice.
The Court's formulation, though the terminology is
somewhat stronger, resembles the traditional equal protection "rational basis" test. One may agree that the
challenged cutoff date is rationally related to the legitimate interest of Nevv York in preventing party "raiding."
But this Court's prior decisions simply do not permit
such an approach. Rather, they recognize that:
" ... the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter
in a free and democratic society. Especially since
the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil
and political rights. any alleged infringement of the
right of citizens to vote must be carefully and
meticulously scrutinized." Reynolds v. Sims, supra,
at 561-562.
Sec also Yick Tro Y. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886).
Voting in a party primary is as protected against state
encroachment as voting in a general election. Bullock
Y. Carter, supra; Terry\'. Ada111s, 345 U. S. 461 (Hl53);
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 290 (1941). And the
Court has said quite explicitly that "if a challenged statute grants the right to vote to some citizrns and denies the
franchise to others, 'the Court must determine whether
the exclusions arc necessary to promote a compelling
state interest.' " Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at 337
(1972), quoting Kramer "· Uuion Free School D·istrict,
supra, at 627. See also Cipriano v. City of Houma, supm,
at 704 (1969); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, sttpra,
at 205, 209 (1970). Likewise. the Court has asserted
that "the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs" is "among our most
precious freedoms," Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S .. supra,
30-31 (1968), anrl must be carefully protected from state
encroachment. NAACP v. Alabama, supm, at 449
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(1958); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516 (1960); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigations Committee, 372
U. S. 539 (1963).
The inquiry thus becomes whether the instant statute,
burdening as it does fundamental political rights, is necessary to advance a compelling state interest. The asserted state interest in this case is the prevention of party
"raiding," which consists of the movement or "cross-over"
by members of one party into another's primary to
"defeat a candidate who is adverse to the interests they
care to advance." n The typical example is a member
of one party deliberately entering another's primary to
help no.minate a weaker candidate, so that his own party's
nominee might win more easily in the general election.
A State does have an interest in preventing such behavior, lest "the efficacy of the party system in the
democratic process-its usefulness in providing a unity
of divergent factions in an alliance for power-be seriF. 2d ously impaired." Rosario Y. Rockefeller, (CA2). The court below held flatly that the state interest in deterring "raiding" was a "compelling" one.
Id., a t -.
The rnatter, however, is not so easily resolved. The
compelling nature of any such interest cannot be determined in a vacuum, but rather in the context of the
means advanced by the State to protect it and the constitutionally sensitive activity it operates to impede.
The state interest here is hardly compelling enough to
sustain the presumption, upon which the statute appears
to be based, that all persons who change or declare party
affiliation nearer than eight to 11 months to a party
primary do so with intent to raid that primary. Any
such presumption assumes a willingness to manipulate
the system 'shich is not likely to be widespread.
11

Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 29.

71-1371-DISSENT
8

ROSARIO v. ROCKEFELLER

Political parties in this country traditionally have been
characterized by a fluidity a.nd overlap of philosophy and
membership. And citizens generally declare or alter
party affiliation for reasons quite unconnected with any
premeditated intention to disrupt or frustrate the plans
of a party with which they are not in sympathy. Citizens customarily choose a party and vote in its primary
simply because it presents candidates and issues more
responsive to their immediate concerns and aspirations.
Such candidates or issues often are not apparent eight to
11 months before a primary. That a citizen should be
absolutely precluded so far in advance from voting in a
party primary in response to a sympathetic candidate,
a new or meaningful issue, or changing party philosophies
in his State, runs contrary to the basic rights of personal
choice and expression which voting in this country was
designed to serve.
Whatever state interest exists for preventing crossovers from one party to another is appreciably lessened
where, as in the case of petitioners, there has been no
previous affiliation with any political party. The danger
of voters in sympathy with one party "raiding" another
party is insubstantial where the voter has made no prior
party commitment at all. Certainly, the danger falls
short of the compelling state interest needed to justify
denying petitioners, so far in advance, the right to declare
an initial party affiliation and vote in the party primary
of their choice.
III
In Dunn, supra, at 343, the Court emphasized that the
State, in pursuing its legitimate interest,
"cannot choose means which unnecessarily burden or
restrict constitutionally protected activity. Statutes
affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with
'precision' NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 419, 438
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(1963); Unite.d States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 265
( 1967), and must be 'tailored' to serve their legitimate objectives. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 394
U. S., at 631. And if there are other, reasonable
ways to achieve these goals with a lessser burden on
constitutionally protected activity, a State may not
choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at
all, it must choose 'less drastic means.' " Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960).
The Court states that placing the enrollment deadline
before the preceding general election serves well the
state interest in discouraging party "raiding." 12 This
fails to address the critical question of whether that interest may be protected adequately by less severe measures.
A foreshortening of the challenged period in this case
would not leave the party structure of New York helpless
and vulnerable to "raiding" activities. Other States, with
varied and complex party systems, have maintained them
successfully without the advanced enrollment deadline
imposed by New York.
Political activities do not constantly engage the attention of Americans. Many citizens do not even vote:
far fewer subtly calculate to enter another party's primary to affect adversely that party's interest, especially
in a day when party labels and loyalties generally are
said to hold less sway over voters. To the extent that
"raiding" does occur, it is most often a last-minute impulsive phenomenon. It is quite unlikely that raiding
would occur with any frequency, were New York to·
reduce its enrollment deadline to one or two months
in advance of a primary. Organizing "raiding" activity
before such a deadline in the face of voter inertia still
would be a difficult task. Though a shortened enrollment deadline may not screen out every "raider" that
1

~

Court opinjon, p. 9.
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the present deadline does, "raiding" would remain a manageable problem and political parties would maintain
their distinctive chara.cter. What is most important, a
"less drastic" enrollment deadline would make the franchise and opportunities for legitimate party participation
available to those who constitutionally have the right to
exercise them. 13

Petitioners also suggest other "less drastic" means of protecting
the State's interest: greater rrlianre on the summar~· disenrollmrnt
procedures of § 332 of the State's election law and loyalt~· oaths,
restricti1·e party afftliation rules optional for tho~e parties who wish
them, limitation of the statute's operation to persons with preexisting party affiliations, and criminal sanctions for fraudulent participation in the electoral process. Tr. of Oral Arg., pp. 13-21. I
make no judgment either on the efficacy of these alternatives in
protecting the State's interest or on their potential infringrment of
con~Litutionally protected rights. Their presence, howen~r, points
to the range and variety of other experimental techniques a1·ailable
for New York to consider.
13
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE DouGLAS, MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, and MR. JusTICE MARSHALL
join, dissenting.
I

It is important at the outset to place New Y ark's cutoff date for party enrollment in perspective. It prevents
prospective voters from registering for a party primary
some eight months before a presidential primary and 11
months before a nonpresidential one. 1 The Court recognizes, as it must, that the period between the enrollment and the primary election is a "lengthy" oue. 2 Indeed, no other State has imposed upon voters previously
unaffiliated with any party restrictions which even approach in severity those of New York. 3 And New York
1
October 2, 1971, was the last day on which petitioners' enrollment
could have been effective. June 20, 1972, was the date of New York'::;
presidential primary. Thus the deadline was actually some eight
and one-half months before the primary. In nonpresidential years,
the cutoff runs from early October until the following September.
2
Court opinion, p. 8.
3 The State docs not dispute this point. Sec Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 34.
Massachusetts, Illinois, Ohio, New Jersry, and Texas permit previously unaffiliated voters to declare their initial party affiliation
immediately prior to voting in the primary of their choice. See
Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, c. 53,§§ 37, 38; Illinois Annotated
Statutes, §§ 5-30; 7-43-7-45; New Jersey Statutes Annotated,
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It is important at the outset to place New York's cutoff date for party enrollment in perspective. It prevents
prospective voters from registering for a party primary
some eight months before a presidential primary and 11
months before a nonpresidential one. 1 The Court recognizes, as it must, that the period between the enrollment and the primary election is a "lengthy" one. 2 Indeed, no other State has imposed upon voters previously
unaffiliated with any party restrictions which even approach in severity those of New York. 3 And New York
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the cutoff runs from early October until the following September.
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concedes that only one other State-Kentucky-has imposed as stringent a primary registration deadline on
persons with prior party affiliations.' Confronted with
such a facially burdensome requirement, I find the Court's
opmwn unconvmcmg.
The right of all persons to vote, once the State has
decided to make it available to some, becomes a basic
one under the Constitution. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U. S. 330 (Hl72); Kramer\'. Union Free School District,
395 U. S. 621 (1969); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89
(1965). Self-expression through the public ballot equally
with one's peers is the essence of a democratic society.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). A citizen without a vote is to a large extent one without a voice in
decisions which may profoundly affect him and his family.
Whatever his disagreement may be with the judgments
of public officials, the citizen should never be given just
cause to think that he was denied an equal right to
elect them.
Yet the Court today upholds a statute ·which imposes
substantial and unnecessary restrictions on this right,
as well as on the closely related right to associate with
the party of one's choice. See Willimns v. Rhodes, 393
U. S. 23 (1968); KAACP Y. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449
19:2:3-45; Vernon'~ Annotatrd Tcxa~ Statute~. Tit. 9, Art. 1:3.0la;
Ohio Rcvicird Code, § 3513.19.
California. and Prnn~ylvania permit pre\'iou~I~- unafliliatrcl voter~
to declare an initial part~· prrfrrenrr up to thr close of rrp;io;tration
immecliatrly prrrrding the primar~·. Califomia Election Code, §§ 22,
:20:3, 311-312 (rrp;i~tration closes in California 5:3 clay~ brfore a
primary); Purdon '~ Penns.l'lvania Statutes Annota1rd, Tit. 2.5, §§ 291
et seq. (rep;istral ion elo::<e~ in Penns~·lvania 50 da~- ~ brforr a
prima r~· ).
::\Iichig;a11 permit~ an~· reg;istcrrd voter to participate in thr prinulr~· of his rhoirr. I\Iiehig;an Compilrd Law~ Annotated,§§ 16i-i ..570,
J6R.575-168.576. See Petitionrr"' Brief, Jlp. 32-33.
'Tr. of Oral Arg., p. :1-1-.
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(1958); United Stales Y. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967).
The Court justifies this holding by placing the responsibility upon petitioners for their failure to enroll, as
required by 1'\ew York law, eight months prior to the
presidential primary. \Ve are told that petitioners
"clearly could have registered and enrolled in the party
of their choice" before the cutoff date and been eligible
to vote in the primary, but for undetermined reasons
"chose not to," and that their disenfranchisement resulted from "their own failure to take timely steps to
effect their enrollment.""
If the cutoff elate were a Jess severe one, I could agree.
Certainly, the State is justified in imposing a reasonable
registration cutoff prior to any primary or general election, beyond which a citizen's failure to register may be
presumed a negligent or wilful act forfeiting his right
to vote in a particular election. But it is difficult to
perceive any persuasive basis for a registration or party
enrollment deadline eight to 11 months prior to election.
Failure to comply \Yith such an extreme deadline can
hardly be used to justify denial of a basic constitutional
right. Numerous prior decisions impose on us the obligation to protect the continuing availability of the franchise for all citizens. not to sanction its prolonged deferment or deprivation. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S.
37 (1879); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Lane
v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
189 (1962); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368 (1963);
TV esberry Y. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v..
Sims, supra; Carrington v. Rash, supra; Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966); Kramer
v. Union Free School District, supra; Cipriano v. City
r. Court opinion, pp. 5, G. Srr al~o Jl. 10 where the Court rrfen:;
io § lHG a~ merdy imposinp; "a lep;itimatc timr limitation on ihrir
rrJCtitioner:s' 1 emollmrnt, which they chose to cli::lrrgnrcl."
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of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Evans v. Cornman, 398
U. S. 419 (1970); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399
U.S. 204 (1970); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972);
D1mn v. Blumstein, supra.
The majority excuses the challenged statute because
it does not "absolutely" disenfranchise petitioners or impose any absolute ban on their freedom of association. 6
The State likewise contends this is "not a disenfranchising statute." 7 The Court apparently views this statn Sec the Conrt'H opinion, at p. 5:
"Section 186 of New York'~ Election Law, however, iH quite differenL
It did not absolutdy di~enfranchise the class to which the pC'titioners
belong-newly registered voters who were eligible 1o enroll in a
party before the previous general election. Rather, the statute~
merdy imposed a time deadline on their enrollment, which they had
to meet in order to participate in the next primary."
Similarl:1' at p. 6:
"The petitioners do not say wh~r they did not C'nroll prior to the
cutoff dare, but it is clear that they could have done so, but chose
not to. Hence, if their plight can be characterized as disenfranchisement at all, it was not caused by § 186, but by their own failure to
take timely steps to effect their enrollment.
"For the same reason, we reject the petitioners' argument that § 186
violated their First and Fourthtecnth Amendment right of free association with the political party of their choice. Since they could
have enrolled in a party in time to participate in the June 1972
primary, § 186 did not constitute a ban on their freedom of association, but merely a time limitation on when they had to act in order
to participate in their chosen party's next primary."
And p. 10:
"New Y ark did not prohibit the petitioners from voting in the 1972
primary election or from associating with the political party of their
choice. It merely imposed a legitimate time limitation on their
enrollment, which they chose to disregard."
In all these instances, the majority seeks to distinguish a "time limitation" from an absolute disenfranchisement of petitioners or an
absolute ban on their associational rights.
7
Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 35.
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ute as postponing rather than denying altogether petitioners' voting and associational rights. 8 I cannot agree.
Deferment of a right, especially one as sensitive and
essential as the exercise of the first duty of citizenship,
can be tantamount to its denial. And any statute which
imposes for eight or 11 months an absolute freeze on
party enrollment and the consequent right to vote does
disenfranchise those who, for quite legitimate reasons,
decide to register closer than eight months to the primary
date and those who, for equally legitimate reasons, wish
to choose or alter party affiliation. Our decisions, however, have never required a permanent ban on the exercise
of voting and associational rights before a constitutional
breach is incurred. Rather, they have uniformly recognized that any serious burden or infringement on such
"constitutionally protected activity" is sufficient to establish a constitutional violation, Dunn v. Blumstein, supra,.
at 343; NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 419, 438 (1963);
Reynolds v. Sims, supra, at 561-562.
II

The majority does not identify the standard of scrutiny it applies to the New York statute. We are told
only that the cutoff date is "not an arbitrary time limit
unconnected to any important state goal"; 0 that it is
"tied to a particularized legitimate purpose and is in no
sense invidious or arbitrary." 10 The Court does not
explain why this formulation was chosen, what precedents
support it, or how and in what contexts it is to be applied. Such nebulous promulgations are bound to leave
the lower courts and state legislatures in doubt and confusion as to how we will approach future significant burs Court opinion, p. 7.
opinion, p. 8.
10 !d., p. 9.

°Court
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dens on the right to vote and to associate freely with the
party of one's choice.
The Court's formulatiou, though the terminology is
somewhat stronger. re:;:cmblcs the traditional equal protection "rational basis" test. One may agree that the
challenged cutoff date is rationally related to the legitimate interest of Kcw York in preventing party "raiding."
But this Court's prior decisions simply do not permit
such an approach. Rather, they recognize that:
" ... the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter
in a free and democratic society. Especially since
the right to exercise the franchjsc in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil
and political rights, any alleged infringement of the
right of citizens to vote must be carefully and
meticulously scrutinized." Reynolds v. Sims, supra,
at 561-562.
Sec also Yick Tl'o v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886).
Voting in a party primary is as protected against state
encroachment as voting in a general election. Bullock
Y. Carter, supra; Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953);
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). And the
Court has said quite explicitly that "if a challenged statute grants the right to vote to some citizens and denies the
franchise to others, 'the Court must determine whether
the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling
state interest.' " Dunn Y. Blumstein, supra, at 337
(1972), quoting Kramer Y. Union Fr·ee School District,.
supra, at 627. See also Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra,
at 704 (1960); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, supra,
at 205, 209 (1070). Likewise, the Court has asserted
that "the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs" is "among our most
precious freedoms," Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S., supra,
30-31 (1968), and must be carefully protected from state
encroachment. NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 441}
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(1958); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516 (1960); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigations Committee, 372
U. S. 539 (1963).
The inquiry thus becomes '"hethcr the instant statute,
burdening as it does fundamental political rights, is necessary to advance a compelling state interest. The asserted state interest in this case is the prevention of party
"raiding." which consists of the movement or "cross-over"
by members of one party into another's primary to
"defeat a candidate who is adverse to the interests they
care to advance." 11 The typical example is a member
of one party deliberately entering another's primary to
help nominate a weaker candidate, so that his own party's
nominee might win more easily in the general election.
A State docs have an interest in preventing such behavior, lest "the efficacy of the party system in the
democratic process-its usefulness in providing a unity
of divergent factions in an alliance for power-be seriously impaired." Rosario v. Rockefeller, F. 2cl (CA2). The court below held flatly that the state interest in deterring "raiding" was a "compelling" one.
Id., a t - .
The matter, however, is not so easily resolved. The
compelling nature of any such interest cannot be determined in a vacuum, but rather in the context of the
means advanced by the State to protect it and the constitutionally sensitive activity it operates to impede.
The state interest here is hardly compelling enough to
sustain the presumption, upon which the statute appears
to be based, that all persons who change or declare party
affiliation nearer than eight to 11 months to a party
primary do so with intent to raid that primary. Any
such presumption assumes a willingness to manipulate
the system which is not likely to be widespread.
11

Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 29.
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Political parties in this country traditionally have been
characterized by a fluidity and overlap of philosophy and
membership. And citizens generally declare or alter
party affiliation for reasons quite unconnected with any
premeditated intention to disrupt or frustrate the plans
of a party with which they are not in sympathy. Citizens customarily choose a party and vote in its primary
simply because it presents candidates and issues more
responsive to their immediate concerns and aspirations.
Such candidates or issues often are not apparent eight to
11 months before a primary. That a citizen should be
absolutely precluded so far in advance from voting in a
party primary in response to a sympathetic candidate,
a new or meaningful issue, or changing party philosophies
in his State, runs contrary to the basic rights of personal
choice and expression which voting in this country was
designed to serve.
Whatever state interest exists for preventing crossovers from one party to another is appreciably lessened
where, as in the case of petitioners, there has been no
previous affiliation with any political party. The danger
of voters in sympathy with one party "raiding" another
party is insubstantial where the voter has made no prior
party commitment at all. Certainly, the danger falls
short of the compelling state interest needed to justify
denying petitioners, so far in advance, the right to declare
an initial party affiliation and vote in the party primary
of their choice.
III
In Dunn, supra, at 343, the Court emphasized that the
State, in pursuing its legitimate interest,
"cannot choose means which unnecessarily burden or
restrict constitutionally protected activity. Statutes
affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with
'precision' NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 419, 438
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(1963); United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 265
( 1967), and must be 'tailored' to serve their legitimate objectives. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 394
U. S., at 631. And if there are other, reasonable
ways to achieve these goals with a lessser burden on
constitutionally protected activity, a State may not
choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at
all, it must choose 'less drastic means.' " Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960).
The Court states that placing the enrollment deadline
before the preceding general election serves well the
state interest in discouraging party "raiding."u This.
fails to address the critical question of whether that interest may be protected adequately by less severe measures.
A foreshortening of the challenged period in this case·
would not leave the party structure of New York helpless
and vulnerable to "raiding" activities. Other States, with
varied and complex party systems, have maintained them
successfully without the advanced enrollment deadline·
imposed by New York.
Partisan political activities do not constantly engage
the attention of large numbers of Americans, especially
as party labels and loyalties tend to be less persuasive
than issues and the qualities of individual candidates.
The crossover in registration from one party to another
is most often impelled by motives quite unrelated to a
desire to raid or distort a party's primary. To the extent
that deliberate raiding occurs, it is usually the result of
organized effort which depends for its success upon some
relatively immediate concern or interest of the voters.
This type of effort is more likely to occur as a primary
date draws near. If .u.ew York were to adopt a more
reasonable enrollment a eadline, say 30 to 60 days, the
period most vulnerable to raiding activity would be pro1

"

Court opinion, p. 9.
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tected. More importantly, a less drastic enrollment
deadline than the eight or 11 months now imposed by
New York would make the franchise and oportunities
for legitimate party participation available to those who
constitutionally have the right to exercise them."'

Ja Petitioners also suggeot other "less drastie" mean~ of protecting
1he Rtnte's interest: greater rrlianee on the ~ummnr~· dil'enrollnwnt
prorrdures of § 3a2 of the State's election law and lo~·nlt~· oath~,
rcstrirtiYe party afiiliation rnlrs optional for thosr partirs who wiHh
them, limitation of the statute'::; operation to prrsonl' with preexisting party affiliations, nnd criminal san.ctiom for fraudulent pnrticipntion in the electoral proce~i:l. Tr. of Ornl Arg., pp. 1:~-21. I
make no judgment either on the efficacy of these alternatiw~ in
protrrting the State's intere::;t or on their potential infringenwnt of
con~titutimwlly protected rights. Their presenrr, howr\·cr·, points
to the range and variety of other experimental trrhnique~ ::w:1ila ble
for New York to consider.
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I

It is important at the outset to place New York's cutoff date for party enrollment in perspective. It prevents
prospective voters from registering for a party primary
some eight months before a presidential primary and 11
months before a nonpresidential one. 1 The Court recognizes, as it must, that the period between the enrollment and the primary election is a "lengthy" one. 2 Indeed, no other State has imposed upon voters previously
unaffiliated with any party restrictions which even approach in severity those of New York. 3 And New York
October 2, 1971, was the last day on whirh petitioners' enrollment
could have been effective. June 20, 1972, was the date of New York's
presidential primary. Thus the deadline was actually some eight
and one-half months before the primary. In nonprc:;idential years,
the cutoff runs from early October until the following September.
2
Court opinion, p. 8.
3 The State does not dispute this point. See Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 34.
MassachusetM, Illinois, Ohio, New Jersey, and Texas permit previously unaffiliated voters to declare their initial party affiliation
immediately prior to voting in the primary of their choice. See
Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, c. 53,§§ 37, 38; Illinois Annotated
Statutes, §§ 5-30; 7-43-7-45; New Jersey Statutes Annotated,
1

f
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concedes that only one other State-Kentucky- has imposed as stringent a primary registration deadline on
persons with prior party affiliations. 4 Confronted with
such a facially burdensome requirement, I find the Court's
opm10n unconvmcmg.
The right of all persons to vote, once the State has
decided to make it available to some, becomes a basic
one under the Constitution. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U. S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School District,
395 U. S. 621 (1969); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89'
(1965). Self-expression through the public ballot equally
with one's peers is the essence of a democratic society.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). A citizen without a vote is to a large extent one without a voice in
decisions which may profoundly affect him and his family.
Whatever his disagreement may be with the judgments
of public officials. the citizen should never be given just
cause to think that he was denied an equal right toelect them.
Yet the Court today upholds a statute which imposes
substantial and unnecessary restrictions on this right,
as well as on the closely related right to associate with
the party of one's choice. Sec Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U. S. 23 (1968); NAACP Y. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449'
19:23-45; Vernon'~ Annotatrrl Tcxa~ Statute><, Tit. 9, ,\rt. 1>l.01a;
Ohio Revised Coclr, § 3.513.19.
California, and Prnn~~'h'a nia perm it JH'CI·iou~l~· unafiil ia trd Yot rr:s
to declare an initial part!· prrfrrcmr up to t hr rlo~r of rrg;istration
immrdiately prrrrding thr primar~· . Cnlifomia Elrction CodP, §§ 22,
203, 311-312 (rrg;i~tratimt do~cs in (';difomia 5:1 cln.''' hdorr a
primar~·); Purdon's Penn~!· [,·a nia Stntutr~ Annotatrd, Tit. 25. §§ 291
ct srq. (rrgist ration elo~rs in Pmm; ~·[yania 50 cla~· s bdorr a
primary).
:\fit·hig;un permits an!' rrg;i;:trrrd 1·ot rr to part ir·ipa lr in t hr primar.'· of his choicr. Michigan Compiled Laws 1\nnotatrcl , §§ IG~.!i70 ,.
168.575-168.576. Srr PPt it ionrr;-;' Brirf, pp. 8:2-:~:).
" Tr. of Oral Arg;., p. 34.
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(1058); United States Y. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967).
The Court justifies this holding by placing the responsibility upon petitioners for their failure to enroll, as
required by Kew York law, eight months prior to the
presidential primary. We are told that petitioners
"clearly could have registered and enrolled in the party
of their choice'' before the cutoff date and been eligible
to vote in the primary, but for undetermined reasons
"chose not to,'' and that their disenfranchisement resulted from "their own failure to take timely steps to
effect their enrollment.""
If the cutoff elate were a less severe one, I could agree.
Certainly, the State is justified in imposing a reasonable
registration cutoff prior to any primary or general election, beyond which a citizen's failure to register may be
presumed a negligent or wilful act forfeiting his right
to vote in a particular election. But it is difficult to
perceive any persuasive basis for a registration or party
enrollment deadline eight to 11 months prior to election.
Failure to comply "\Yith such an extreme deadline can
hardly be used to justify denial of a basic constitutional
right. Numerous prior decisions impose on us the obligation to protect the continuing availability of the franchise for all citizens, not to sanction its prolonged deferment or deprivation. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S.
37 (1879); Nircon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Lane
Y. ·wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
189 (1962); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368 (Hl63);
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v.
Sims, supra; Carrington v. Rash, supra; Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966); Kramer
v. Union Free School District, supra; Cipriano v. City
5
Court opinion, pp. 5, G. Scr abo p. 10 wherr the Court rrfrr~
to § lSG as merely imposing "a lrgitimatc i imr limitation on their
[petitioner:;'] enrollment, which thrr chose to di~rrgard."
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of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Evans v. Cornman, 398
U. S. 419 (1970); C1"ty of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399
U.S. 204 (1970); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972);
D~mn v. Blumstein, supra.
The majority excuses the challenged statute because·
it does not "absolutely" disenfranchise petitioners or impose any absolute ban on their freedom of association. 6
The State likewise contends this is "not a disenfranchising statute." 7 The Court apparently views this statr. See the Court's opinion, at p. 5:
"Srction 186 of New York's Elrction Law, howevrr, is qnitr diffrrrnt.
1t did not absolutrly disrnfr:mchisr thr class to which the prt itioners
brlong-nrwly registerrd votrrs who wNr eligible to 0nroll in a
party before the previous grnNal elrction. Rathrr, the st atutrs
merrly imposed a timr draclline on thrir enrollmrnt, whirh 1!10~· had
to meet in order to participate in the next primary."
Similarly at p. 6:
"Thr petitioners do not say wh~· they did not rnroll prior to the
rntoff date, but it is rlear that they could have donr so, but chose
not to. Hence, if their plight ran be characterizrd a~ disenfranchisement at all, it was not rausrd by § 186, but by their own failure to
take timely steps to effect their enrollmrnt.
"For the same rea. on, wr rrjrrt the petitioners' argumrnt that § 186
Yiobted their First and Fourthteenth Amendment right of free association with the political party of their choice. Since they could
have enrolled in n party in time to participatr in the Jnnr 1972
primary, § 186 did not constitute a ban on their frrrclom of assoriation, but merely a time limitation on when they had to art in order
to participate iu their chosen party's next primary."
And p. 10:
"New York did not prohibit the petitioners from voting in the 1972
primary election or from associating with the political party of their
choire. It merely imposed a legitimate time limitation on their
enrollment, which they chose to disregard."
In all these instances, thr majority seeks to distinguish a "time limitation" from an absolute discnfranrhi~rment of petitioners or an
absolute ban on their associational rights.
' Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 35.

71-1371-DISSENT
ROSARIO v. ROCKEFELLER

5

ute as postponing rather than denying altogether petitioners' voting and associational rights. 8 I cannot agree.
Deferment of a right, especially one as sensitive and'
essential as the exercise of the first duty of citizenship,
can be tantamount to its denial. And any statute which
imposes for eight or 11 months an absolute freeze on
party enrollment and the consequent right to vote does
disenfranchise those who, for quite legitimate reasons,
decide to register closer than eight months to the primary
date and those who, for equally legitimate reasons, wish
to choose or alter party affiliation. Our decisions, however, have never required a permanent ban on the exercise·
of voting and associational rights before a constitutional
breach is incurred. Rather, they have uniformly recognized that any serious burden or infringement on such
"constitutionally protected activity" is sufficient to establish a constitutional violation, Dunn v. Blumstein, supra,
at 343; NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 419, 438 (1963);
Reynolds v. Sims, supra, at 561-562.
II

The majority does not identify the standard of scrutiny it applies to the New· York statute. We are told'
only that the cutoff date is "not an arbitrary time limit
unconnected to any important state goal"; 9 that it is
"tied to a particularized legitimate purpose and is in no
sense invidious or arbitrary." 10 The Court does not
explain why this formulation was chosen, what precedents
support it, or how and in what contexts it is to be applied. Such nebulous promulgations are bound to leave
the lower courts and state legislatures in doubt and confusion as to how we will approach future significant burCourt opinion, p. 7.
Court opinion, p. 8.
10
I d., p. 9.
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dens on the right to vote and to associate freely with the
party of one's choice.
The Court's form.ulation, though the terminology is
somewhat stronger, res0.mblcs the traditional equal protection "rational basis" test. One may agree that the
challenged cutoff elate is rationally related to the legitimate interest of New York in preventing party "raiding."
But this Court's prior decisions simply do not permit
such an approach. Rather, they recognize that:
" ... the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter
in a free and democratic society. Especially since
the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil
and political rights, any alleged infringement of the
right of citizens to vote must be carefully and
meticulously scrutinized." Reynolds v. Sirns, supra,
at 561-562.
See also Yick TYo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886).
Voting in a party primary is as protected against state
encroachment as voting in a general election. Bullock
v. Carter, supra; 'Perry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953);
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). And the
Court has said quite explicitly that "if a challenged statute grants the right to vote to some citizens and denies the
franchise to others, 'the Court must determine "·hether
the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling
state interest.'" Dunn Y. Blumstein, supra, at 337
(1972), quoting Kramer v. Union Free School District,
supra, at 627. See also Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra,
at 704 (1969); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, supra,
at 205, 209 (1070). Likewise, the Court has asserted
that "the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs" is "among our most
precious freedoms," Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S., supra,
30-31 (1968), and must be carefully protected from state
encroachment. NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 449
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(1958); Rates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516 (1960); Gibson v. Florida Legislat·ive Investigations Committee, 372
u. s. 539 (1963).
The inquiry thus becomes whether the instant statute,
burdening as it does fundamental political rights, is necessary to advance a compelling state interest. The asserted state interest in this case is the prevention of party
"raiding." which consists of the movement or "cross-over"
by members of one party into another's primary to
"defeat a candidate who is adverse to the interests they
care to advance." l l The typical example is a member
of one party deliberately entering another's primary to
help nominate a weaker candidate, so that his own party's
nominee might win more easily in the general election.
A State does have an interest in preventing such behavior, lest "the efficacy of the party system in the
democratic process-its usefulness in providing a unity
of divergent factions in an alliance for power-be seriously impaired." Rosario Y. Rockefell er, F. 2d (CA2). The court belo"· held flatly that the state interest in deterring "raiding" \\'as a "compelling" one.
!d., at - .
The matter, however, is not so easily resolved. The
compelling nature of any such interest cannot be determined in a vacuum, but rather in the context of the
means advanced by the State to protect it and the constitutionally sensitive activity it operates to impede.
The state interest here is hardly compelling enough to
sustain the presumption, upon which the statute appears
to be based, that all persons who change or declare party
affiliation nearer than eight to 11 months to a party
primary do so with intent to raid that primary. Any
such presumption assumes a willingness to manipulate
the system which is not likely to be widespread.
11

Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 29.
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Political parties in this country traditionally have been
characterized by a fluidity and overlap of philosophy and
membership. And citizens generally declare or alter
party a.ffiliation for reasons quite unconnected with any
premeditated intention to disrupt or frustrate the plans
of a party with which they are not in sympathy. Citizens customarily choose a party and vote in its primary
simply because it presents candidates and issues more
responsive to their immediate concerns and aspirations.
Such candidates or issues often arc not apparent eight to
11 months before a primary. That a citizen should be
absolutely precluded so far in advance from voting in a
party primary in response to a sympathetic candidate,
a new or meaningful issue, or changing party philosophies
in his State. runs contrary to the basic rights of personal
choice and expression which voting in this country was
designed to serve.
Whatever state interest exists for preventing crossovers from one party to another is appreciably lessened
where, as in the case of petitioners, there has been no
previous affiliation with any political party. The danger
of voters in sympathy with one party "raiding" another
party is insubstantial where the voter has made no prior
party commitment at all. Certainly, the danger falls
short of the compelling state interest needed to justify
denying petitioners, so far in advance, the right to declare
an initial party affiliation and vote in the party primary
of their choice.

III
In Dunn, supra, at 343, the Court emphasized that the
State, in pursuing its legitimate interest,
"cannot choose means which unnecessarily burden or
restrict constitutionally protected activity. Statutes
affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with
'precision' NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 419, 438
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(1963); United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 265
( 1967), and must be 'tailored' to serve their legitimate objectives. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 394
U. S., at 631. And if there are other, reasonable
ways to achieve these goals with a lessser burden on
constitutionally protected activity, a State may not
choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at
all, it must choose 'less drastic means.' " Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960).
The Court states that placing the enrollment deadline
before the preceding general election serves well the
state interest in discouraging party "raiding."'" This
fails to address the critical question of whether that interest may be protected adequately by less severe measures.
A foreshortening of the challenged period in this case
would not leave the party structure of New York helpless
and vulnerable to "raiding" activities. Other States, with
varied and complex party systems, have maintained them
successfully without the advanced enrollment deadline·
imposed by New York.
Partisan political activities do not constantly engage
the attention of large numbers of Americans, especially
as party labels and loyalties tend to be less persuasive
than issues and the qualities of individual candidates.
The crossover in registration from one party to another
is most often impelled by motives quite unrelated to a
desire to raid or distort a party's primary. To the extent
that deliberate raiding occurs, it is usually the result of
organized effort which depends for its success upon some
relatively immediate concern or interest of the voters.
This type of effort is more likely to occur as a primary
date draws near. If new York were to adopt a more
reasonable enrollment deadline, say 30 to 60 days, the
period most vulnerable to raiding activity would be pro1

"

Court opinion, p. 9.
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tected. More importantly, a less drastic enrollment
deadline than the eight or 11 months now imposed by
New York would make the franchise and oportunities
for legitimate party participation available to those who
constitutionally have the right to exercise them."'

13 Petitioners also SUI/:ge8t other "less drastic " mr~m s ol' protrrting
the State's intrrrHt: greater reliance on the Rummary disr urollme11t
procedures of § 333 of the State's dection law and loyalt~· oaths,
rcstricti1·e party afftliation rules optional for those partirs who wish
them , limitat ion of the statute's operation to pers011R with preexisting part~· affiliations, and crimiu:-~1 sanctions for frauclulrnt participation in thr elrctoral process. Tr. of Oral Arl/:. , pp. 13-21. I
make no judgment either on the efficacy of these alternati1·es in
protecting the State's intrre~t or on their potential infringrmrnt of
constitutionally protected right H. Their pre~rncr, howr,·er , point s
to the range and y:uiety of other experimental techniqurs aYailablc
for New York to consider.

l
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 71- 1371
Pedro J. Rosario et al.,
Petitioners,

On Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court
of Appeals for the SecNelson Rockefeller, Governor
ond Circuit.
of the State of New
York, et al.

v.

[March -, 19731
Mn. Jus·riCE Po-wELL, with whom MR. JusTICE DouGLAS, MR. Jus·riCE BRENNAN, and Mn. JusTICE MARSHALL

joi11, dissenting.
I

It is important at the outset to place New York's cutoff date for party enrollment in perspective. It prevents
prospective voters from registering for a party primary
some eight months before a presidential primary and 11
months before a nonpresidential one. 1 The Court recognizes, as it must, that the period between the enrollment and the primary election is a "lengthy" one. 2 Indeed, no other State has imposed upon voters previously
unaffiliated with any party restrictions which even approach in severity those of New York. 3 And New York
October 2, 1971 , was the b st day on which petitioners' enrollment
could have been effective. June 20, 1972, was the date of New York's
presidential primary. Thus the deadline was actually some eight
and one-half months before the primary. In nonpresiclential years,
the cutoff runs from early October until the following September.
2
Court opinion, p. 8.
3 The State docs not dispute this point. See Tr. of Oral Arg. , p. 34.
Massachusetts, Illinois, Ohio, New .Jersey, and Texas permit preYiously unaffiliated Yoters to declare their initial party affiliation
immediately prior to voting in the primary of their choice. See
Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, c. 53,§§ 37, 38; Illinois Annotated
Statutes, §§ 5-30; 7-43-7-45; New Jersey Statutcs Annotated,
1
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concedes that only one other State-Kentucky-has imposed as stringent a primary registration deadline on
persons with prior party affiliations. 4 Confronted with
such a facially burdensome requirement, I find the Court's
opinion unconvincing.
The right of all persons to vote, once the State has
decided to make it available to some, becomes a basic
one under the Constitution. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U. S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School District,
395 U. S. 621 (1969); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89
(1965). Self-expression through the public ballot equally
with one's peers is the essence of a democratic society.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964). A citizen without a vote is to a large extent one without a voice in
decisions which may profoundly affect him and his family.
Whatever his disagreement may be with the judgments
of public officials, the citizen should never be given just
cause to think that he was denied an equal right to
elect them.
Yet the Court today upholds a statute which imposes
substantial and unnecessary restrictions on this right,
as well as on the closely related right to associate with
the party of one's choice. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U. S. 23 (1968); NAACP Y. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449
19 :2:l-45; Yernon's Annotatrd Texas Statutes, Tit. 9, Art. 1:).01a;
Ohio Revised Code, § 351:3.19.
Californi::t and Pennsylvania permit prc\· iou~ly unafli.liatrd \·oten;
to declare an initial part~· prcfrrence up to thr rlose of rrgistration
immediately precrdinp: thr primar~·. California Elrction Corle.§§ 22,
203. 311-312 (rrgist ration rlosrs in Califor11ia s:l day~ brforc a
primary); Purdon's Pmm~~·lyania Statutes Annotated. Tit. 25, §§ 291
et seq. (rrgistrntion rlo~es in Pcnns,\·lnnja 50 cia~-~ bcl'ore a
primary).
Michigan permits any registered voter to participate in the primary of his choice. Michigan Compiled Lnw:-; Anuotatrd, §§ 168.!)70,
168.575-168.576. Sec Petitioner:-;' Brief, pp. :~2-33.
4
'I r. of Oral Arg. , p. 34.

..
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(1958); United States Y. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967).
The Court justifies this holding by placing the responsibility upon petitioners for their failure to enroll, as
required by New York law, eight months prior to the
presidential primary. vYe arc told that petitioners
"clearly could have registered and enrolled in the party
of their choice" before the cutoff date and been eligible
to vote in the primary, but for undetermined reasons
"chose not to," and that their disenfranchisement resulted from "their own failure to take timely steps to
effect their enrollment." "
If the cutoff elate were a less severe one, I could agree.
Certainly, the State is justified in imposing a reasonable
registration cutoff prior to any primary or general election, beyond which a citizen's failure to register may be
presmned a negligent or wilful act forfeiting his right
to vote in a particular election. But it is difficult to
perceive any persuasive basis for a registration or party
enrollment deadline eight to 11 months prior to election.
Failure to cornply with such an extreme deadline can
hardly be used to .i ustify denial of a fundamental constitutional right. ::\f"umcrous prior decisions impose on us the
obligation to protect the coutinuinug availability of the
franchise for all citizens, not to sanction its prolonged deferment or deprivation. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S.
37 (1879); Ni.1:on v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Lane
Y. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 (1939); Balfer v. Carr, 369 U. S.
189 (1962); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368 (1963);
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v.
Sims, supra; Carrington v. Rash, supra; Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966); Kramer
v. Union Free School District, supra; Cipriano v. City
" Court opinion, pp. 5, 6. See al;;o p. 10 wherr the Court refer:;
to § 186 as merPly impoHing "a lPgitimate time limitation on their
[petitioners' J emollment, which they chose to di~rPgard."
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of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Evans v. Cornman, 398
U. S. 419 (1970); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399
U.S. 204 (1970); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972);
Dunn v. Blumstein, supra.
The majority excuses the challenged statute because
it does not "absolutely" disenfranchise petitioners or impose any absolute ban on their freedom of association. 6
The State likewise contends this is "not a disenfranchis-·
ing statute." 7 The Court apparently views this stat- ,
ute as a mere "time deadline" on petitioners' enrollment
that disadvantages no identifiable class and that postpones through the next primary rather than denies altoSee the Court's opinion, at p. 5:
"Section 186 of New York's Election Law, however, is quite differcut.
It did not absolutely disenfranchise the class to which the petitioners
belong-newly registered voters who were eligible to enroll in a
party before the previous general election. Rather, the statutes
merely imposed a time deadline on their enrollment, which they had
to meet in order to participate in the nexi primary."
Similarly at p. 6:
"For the same rea.-on , we reject the petitioner:;' argumrnt that § 186
Yiolated their First and Fourthteenth Amendment right of free association with the political party of their choice. Since they could
have enrollrd in a party in time to pnrtiripate in tho Junr 1972
primary, § 186 did not constitute a ban on their frerdom of association, but merely a time limitation on when they had to art in order
to participate in their chosen party's next primar~'·"
And p. 10:
"New York did not prohibit the petitioners from ,·oting in the 1972
primary election or from associating with the politirnl part~· of 1heir
choice. It merely imposed a legitimate time limitation on their
enrollment, which they chose to disregard."
In all these instances, the majority seeks to distinguish a "time limitation" from an absolute disenframhisemcnt of petitioners or an
absolute ban on their as~ociational rights.
7
Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 35.
0
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gether petitioners' voting and associational rights.s I
cannot agree. Deferment of a right, especially one as
sensitive and essential as the exercise of the first duty of
citizenship, can be tantamount to its denial. And any
statute which imposes for eight or 11 months an absolute
freeze on party enrollment and the consequent right to
vote totally disenfranchises a class of persons who, for
quite legitimate reasons, decide to register closer than
eight months to the primary date and those who, for
equally legitimate reasons, wish to choose or alter party
affiliation. Our decisions, moreover, have never required
a permanent ban on the exercise of voting and associa-·
tional rights before a constitutional breach is incurred.
Rather, they have uniformly recognized that any serious
burden or infringement on such "constitutionally protected activity" is sufficient to establish a constitutional
violation, Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at 343; NAACP v.
Button, 371 U. S. 419, 438 (1963); Reynolds v. Sims,
supra, at 561-562.
II
The majority does not identify the standard of scru-tiny it applies to the New York statute. We are told
only that the cutoff date is "not an arbitrary time limit
unconnected to any important state goal"; 9 that it is.
"tied to a particularized legitimate purpose and is in no
sense invidious or arbitrary." 10 The Court does not
explain why this formulation was chosen, what precedents
support it, or how and in what contexts it is to be applied. Such nebulous promulgations are bound to leave
the lower courts and state legislatures in doubt and confusion as to how we will approach future significant bur-·
s Court opinion, p. 5 and n. 6 supra.
Court opinion, p. 8.
10
I d., p. 9.
9

'

I

I
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dens on the right to vote and to associate freely with the
party of one's choice.
The Court's formulation, though the terminology is
somewhat stronger, resemblE's the traditional equal protection "rational basis" test. One may agree that the
challenged cutoff date is rationally related to the legitimate interest of New York in preventing party "raiding."
But this Court's prior decisions simply do not permit
such an approach. Rather, they recognize that:
" ... the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter
in a free and democratic society. Especially since
the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil
and political rights, any alleged infringement of the
right of citizens to vote must be carefully and
meticulously scrutinized." Reynolds v. Sims, sttpra,
at 561-562.
See also Yick TVa v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886).
Voting in a party primary is as protected against state
encroachment as voting in a general election. Bullock
v. Carter, supra; Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953);
Un-ited States v. ClaBsic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). And the
Court has said quite explicitly that "if a challenged statute grants the right to vote to some citizens and denies the
franchise to others, 'the Court must determine \vhether
the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling
state interest.' " Dunn Y. Blumstein, supra, at 337
(1972), quoting Kramer Y. Union Free School Distr-ict,
supra, at 627. Sec also Cipriano Y. City of Houma, supra,
at 704 (1969); City of Phoeni.'"C v. Kolodziejski, supra,
at 205, 209 (1970). Likewise, the Court has asserted
that "the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs" is "among our most
precious freedoms," W ·illiams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S., supra,
30-31 (1968), and must be carefully protected from state
encroachment. NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 449
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(1958); Bates v. Diltle Rock, 361 U. S. 516 (1960); Gibson Y. Florida Legislative Investigations Committee, 372
u. s. 53!) (1963) .
The inquiry thus becomes whether the instant statute,
burdening as it does fundamental constitutional rights,
can withstand the strict judicial scrutiny called for by
our prior cases. The asserted state interest in this case 1
is the prevention of party "raiding," which consists of the
nwvement or "cross-over" by members of one party into
another's primary to "defeat a candidate who is adverse
to the interests they care to advance." ~., The typical
example is a member of one party deliberately entering
another's primary to help nominate a weaker candidate,
so that his own party's nominee might vvin nwre easily in
the general election. A State does have an interest in
preventing such behavior, lest "the efficacy of the party
system in the democratic process- its usefulness in providing a unity of divergent factions in an alliance for
power-be seriously impaired," Rosairo v. Rockefeller,
- F . 2 d - (CA2). The court below held flatly that
the state in tcrest in deterring "raiding" was a "compelling" one. I d., at - -.
The matter, however, is not so easily resolved. The
importance or significance of any such interest cannot be
determined in a vacuum, but rather in the context of the
means advanced by the State to protect it and the constitutionally sensitive activity it operates to impede.
The state interest here is hardly substa11tial enough to ~
sustain the presumption, upon which the statute appears
to be based, that most persons who change or declare party
affiliation nearer than eight to 11 months to a party
primary do so with intent to raid tha.t primary. Any
such presumption assumes a willingness to manipulate
the system which is not likely to be widespread.

J

I

11

Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 29.
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Political parties ln this country traditionally have been
characterized by a fluidity and overlap of philosophy and
membership. And citizens generally declare or alter
party affiliation for reasons quite unconnected with any
premeditated intention to disrupt or frustrate the plans
of a party with which they are not in sympathy. Citizens customarily choose a party and vote in its primary
simply because it presents candidates and issues more
responsive to their immediate concerns and aspirations.
Such candidates or issues often are not apparent eight to
11 months before a primary. That a citizen should be
absolutely precluded so far in advance from voting in a
party primary in response to a sympathetic candidate,
a new or meaningful issue, or changing party philosophies
in his State, runs contrary to the fundamental rights of
personal choice and expression which voting in this country was designed to serve.
Whatever state interest exists for preventing crossovers from one party to another is appreciably lessened
where, as in the case of petitioners, there has been no
previous affiliation with any political party. The danger
of voters in sympathy with one party "raiding" another
party is insubstantial where the voter has made no prior
party commitment at all. Certainly, the danger falls
short of the overriding state interest needed to justify
denying petitioners, so far in advance, the right to declare
an initial party affiliation and vote in the party primary
of their choice.
III
In Dunn, supra, at 343, the Court emphasized that the
State, in pursuing its legitimate interest,
"cannot choose means which unnecessarily burden or
restrict constitutionally protected activity. Statutes
affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with
'precision' NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 419, 438

I

1
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(1963); United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 265
( 1967), and must be 'tailored' to serve their legitimate objectives. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 394
U. S., at 631. And if there are other, reasonable
ways to achieve these goals with a lessser burden on
constitutionally protected activity, a State may not
choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at
all, it must choose 'less drastic means.' " Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960).
The Court states that placing the enrollment deadline
before the preceding general election serves well the
state interest in discouraging party "raiding. 1112 This.
fails to address the critical question of whether that interest may be protected adequately by less severe measures.
A foreshortening of the challenged period in this case
would not leave the party structure of New York help less
and vulnerable to "raiding" activities. Other States, with
varied and complex party systems, have maintained them
successfully without the advanced enrollment deadline
imposed by New York.
Partisan political activities do not constantly engage
the attention of large numbers of Americans, especially
as party labels and loyalties tend to be less persuasive
than issues and the qualities of individual candidates.
The crossover in registration from one party to another
is most often impelled by motives quite unrelated to a
desire to raid or distort a party's primary. To the extent
that deliberate raiding occurs, it is usually the result of
organized effort which depends for its success upon some
relatively immediate concern or interest of the voters.
This type of effort is more likely to occur as a primary
date draws near. If New York were to adopt a more
reasonable enrollment deadline, say 30 to 60 days, the
period most vulnerable to raiding activity would be pro1

"

Court opinion, p. 9.
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tected. More importantly, a less drastic enrollment
deadline than the eight or 11 months now imposed by
New York would make the franchise and oportunities
for legitimate party participation available to those who
constitutionally have the right to exercise them.n

Petitioners also suggest other "less drastic" means of protecting
the State's interesL: greater reliance on the summnry disenrollment
procedures of § 332 of the State's election law and loyalty oathH,.
restrictiYe party affiliation rules optional for those parties who wish
them, limitation of the statute's operation to persons with preexisting party affiliations, and criminal sanctions for fraudulent participation in the electoral process. Tr. of Ornl Arg., p]l. 13-21. I
make no judgment either on the efficacy of these alternatiYes in
protecting the State's inLerest or on their potential infrin11:emcnt of
constitutionally protected rights. Their pre~ence, however, points
to the range and variety of other experimental techniques available·
for New York to consider.
13

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATFlj
No. 71-1371
Pedro J. Rosario et al.,
Petitioners,

On Writ of Certiorari to
v.
the United States Court
of Appeals for the SecNelson Rockefeller, Governor
ond Circuit.
of the State of New
York, et al.
[March 21, 1973]
MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE DouGLAS, MR. JusTICFJ BRENNAN, and MR. JusTICE MARSHALL
join, dissenti'ng.
I
It is important at the outset to place New York's cutoft' date for party enrollment in perspective. It prevents
prospective voters from registering for a party primary
some eight months before a presidential primary and 11
months before a nonpresidential one. 1 The Court recognizes, as it must, that the period between the enrollment and the primary election is a "lengthy" one. 2 Indeed, no other State has imposed upon voters previously
unaffiliated with any party restrictions which even approach in severity those of New York. 8 And New York
October 2, 1971, was the last day on which petitioners' enrollment
could have been effective. June 20, 1972, was the date of New York's
presidential primary. Thus the deadline was actually some eight
and one-half months before the primary. In nonpresidential years,
the cutoff runs from early October until the following September.
2
Court opinion, p. 8.
3 The State does not dispute this point. See Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 34.
Massachusetts, Illinois, Ohio, New Jersey, and Texas permit previously unaffiliated voters to declare their initial party affiliation
immediately prior to voting in the primary of their choice. See
Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, c. 53,§§ 37, 38; Illinois Annotated
Statutes, §§ 5-30: 7-43-7-45 ; New Jersey Statutes Annotated~
1
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concedes that only one other State-Kentucky_:_has imposed as stringent a primary registration deadline on
persons with prior party affiliations. 4 Confronted with
such a facially burdensome requirement, I find the Court's
opmwn unconvmcmg.
The right of all persons to vote, once the State has
decided to make it available to some, becomes a basic
one under the Constitution. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U. S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School District,
395 U. S. 621 (1969); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89
( 1965). Self-expression through the public ballot equally
with one's peers is the essence of a democratic society.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). A citizen without a vote is to a large extent one without a voice in
decisions which may profoundly affect him and his family.
Whatever his disagreement may be with the judgments
of public officials, the citizen should never be given just
cause to think that he was denied an equal right to
elect them.
Yet the Court today upholds a statute which imposes
substantial and unnecessary restrictions on this right,
as well .as on the closely related right to associate with
the party of one's choice. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U. S. 23 (1968); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449
•

•

•

0

19:23-45; Vernon's Annotated Texas Statutes, Tit. 9, Art. 13.01a;
Ohio Revised Code, § 3513.19.
California and Penm;ylvania permit prev10u~ly unaffiliated voters
to drclarr an ini1ial party prrfrrenec up to the close of registration
immediately preceding the primary. California Election Code, §§ 22,
203, 311-312 (registration closes in California 53 days before n.
primary); Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated, Tit. 25, §§ 291
et seq. (rrgistration closes in Prnnsylvanja 50 days before a
primary)
Michigan permits any reg1sterrd vo1Pr to participate in the primary of lu~ choice. Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated, §§ 168.570,
108.575-16R.576. Sre Peti1ionPrs' Brief, pp. 32-33.
1
Tr of Oral Arg., p. 34.
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(1958); United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967).
The Court justifies this holding by placing the responsibility upon petitioners for their failure to enroll, as
required by New York law, eight months prior to the
presidential primary. We are told that petitioners
"clearly could have registered and enrolled in the party
of their choice" before the cutoff date and been eligible
to vote in the primary, but for undetermined reasons
"chose not to," and that their disenfranchisement resulted from "their own failure to take timely steps to
effect their enrollment." 5
If the cutoff date were a less severe one, I could agree.
Certainly, the State is justified in imposing a reasonable
registration cutoff prior to any primary or general election, beyond which a citizen's failure to register may be
presumed a negligent or wilful act forfeiting his right
to vote in a particular election. But it is difficult to
perceive any persuasive basis for a registration or party
enrollment deadline eight to 11 months prior to election.
Failure to comply with such an extreme deadline can
hardly be used to justify denial of a fundamental constitutional right. Numerous prior decisions impose on us the
obligation to protect the continuing availability of the
franchise for all citizens, not to sanction its prolonged deferment or deprivation. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S.
37 (1879); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Lane
v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
189 (1962); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368 (1963);
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v.
Sims, supra; Carrington v. Rash, supra; Harper v. Virginia Board of Election.s, 383 U. S. 663 (1966); Kramer
v. Union Free School District, supra; Cipriano v. City
5 Court opmion, pp. 5, 6.
Sre also p . 10 where the Court refers
to § 186 as merely imposing "a lrgitimatr time limitlltion on theil"
(Jwtitioners'l enrollment. which thry choHe to di::;rf'gard ."
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of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Evans v. Cornman, 398
U. S. 419 (1970); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 39g
U.S. 204 (1970); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972);
Dunn v. Blumstein, supra.
The majority excuses the challenged statute because
it does not "absolutely" disenfranchise petitioners or im~
pose any absolute ban on their freedom of association.(!'
The State likewise contends this is "not a disenfranchising statute." 7 The Court apparently views this statute as a mere "time deadline" on petitioners' enrollment
that disadvantages no identifiable class and that postpones through the next primary rather than denies alton See

the Court's opinion, at p. 5:

'"Section li\6 of New York's Election Law, however, i~ quite different.
It did not absolutely eli enfranchise the class to which the prtitioners
belong-newly registered voters who were rligible to enroll in a
party before the previous general election. Rather, the statutes
merely imposed a time deadline on their enrollment, which they had
to meet in ordrr to participate in the next primary."
Similarly at p. 6:
"For thr samr rrason, we rrject the prtitioners' argument that § 186
vwlatrd their First and Fourthternth Amendment right of free association with the political party of their choice. Since they could
have rnrollecl in a party in time to participate in the June 1972
pnmary, § 186 did not constitute a ban on their freedom of associatiOn, but merely a time limitation on whrn they had to act in order
to participate in their chosen party's next primary."
And p . 10:
"New York did nDt prohibit the petitioners from voting in the 1972
primary electwn or from associating with the political party of their
choice. It merely imposed a legitimate time limitation on their
enrollment, which they chose to disregard."

In all these in:;tances, the majority serks to distinguish a "time lim-itation" from an absolute disrnfranchisement of petitioners or an
~b:;olute ban on then associittional rights .
7 Tr of Oral Arg., p. 35
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gether petitioners· voting and associational rights. 8 I
cannot agree. Deferment of a right, especially one as
sensitive and essential as the exercise of the first duty of
citizenship, can be tantamount to its denial. And any
statute which imposes for eight or 11 months an absolute
freeze on party enrollment and the consequent right to
vote totally disenfranchises a class of persons who, for
quite legitimate reasons, decide to register closer than
eight months to the primary date and those who, for
equal1y legitimate reasons. wish to choose or alter party
affiliation. Our decisions. moreover. have never required
a permanent ban on the exercise of voting and associational •rights before a constitutional breach is incurred.
Rather. they have uniformly recognized that any serious
burden or infringement on such "constitutionally protected activity" is sufficient to establish a constitutional
violation. Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at 343; NAACP v.
Button, 371 U. S. 419. 438 (1963); Reynolds v. Sims,
supr-a, at 561-562.
If

The majority does not identify the standard of scrutiny it applies to the New York statute. We are told
only that the cutoff date is "not an arbitrary time limit
unconnected to any important state goal"; 9 that it is
"tied to a particularized legitimate purpose and is in no
sense invidious or arbitrary." 10 The Court does not
explain why this formulation was chosen, what precedents
support it, or how and in what contexts it is to be ap~
plied. Such nebulous promulgations are bound to leave
the lower courts and state legislatures in doubt and confusion as to how we will approach future significant bur-.
'Court opiJllon. p. 5 and
Court opmwn, p . 8,
'"ld , I?· 9,

u

tt

(i

supra ,
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dens 011 the right to vote and to associate freely with the
party of one's choice.
The Court's formulation, though the terminology is
somewhat stronger, resembles the traditional equal protection "rational basis" test. One may agree that the
challenged cutoff date is rationally related to the legitimate interest of New York in preventing party "raiding."
But this Court's prior decisions simply do not permit
such an approach. Rather, they recognize that :
" . .. the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter
in a free and democratic society. Especially since·
the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil
and political rights, any alleged infringement of the
right of citizens to vote must be carefully and
meticulously scrutinized." Reynolds v. Sims, supra,
at 561-562.
See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886).
Voting in a party primary is as protected against state·
encroachment as voting in a general election. Bullock
v. Carter, supra; Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953);
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). And the
Court has said quite explicitly that "if a challenged statute grants the right to vote to some citizens and denies the
franchise to others, 'the Court must determine whether
the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling
state interest.' '' Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at 337
(1972), quoting Kramer v. Union Free School District,
supra, at 627. See also Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra,
at 704 (1969); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, supra,
at 205, 209 (1970). Likewise, the Court has asserted
that "the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs" is "among our most
precious freedoms. " Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S., supra,
30-31 (1968). and must be carefully protected from state·
Pncroachment
NAACP v Alabama. supra, at 4491
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(1958); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigations Committee, 372
U. S. 539 (1963) .
The inquiry thus becomes whether the instant statute,
burdening as it does fundamental constitutional rights,
can withstand the strict judicial scrutiny called for by
our prior cases. The asserted state interest in this case
ts the prevention of party "raiding,'' which consists of the
movement or "cross-over" by members of one party into
another's primary to "defeat a candidate who is adverse
~o the interests they care to advance." u
The typical
example is a member of one party deliberately entering
another's primary to help nominate a weaker candidate,
so that his own party's nominee might win more easily in
the general election. A State does have an interest in
preventing such behavior, lest "the efficacy of the party
system in the democratic process-its usefulness in pro\.licling a unity of divergent factions in an alliance for
power-be seriously impaired.'' Rosairo v. Rockefeller,
-- F. 2d- (CA2). The court below held flatly that
the state interest in deterring "raiding'' was a "compelllng" OIH' . fd., at -The matter, however, is not so easily resolved. The ,
1~nportance or significance of any such interest cannot be
drtermined m a vacuum, but rather in the context of the
means advanced by the State to protect it and the constitutionally sensitive activity it operates to impede.
The state llltrrest here is hardly substantial enough to
s.ustain the presumption, upon which the statute appears
t.o be based, that most persons who change or declare party
affiliation nearer than eight to 11 months to a party
jlrimary do so with intent to raid that primary. Any
such presumption assumes a willingness to manipulate
the system which is not likely to be widespread .
l 7 T! .

ot Ornl. Arg

p 29.
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Political parties iu this country traditionally have beert
characterized by a fluidity and overlap of philosophy and
membership. And citi.10ens generally declare. or alter
party affiliation for reasons quite unconnected with any
premeditated intention to disrupt or frustrate the plans
of a party with which they are not in sympathy. Ci€1zens customarily choose a party and vote in its primary
sunply because it presents candidates and issues more
responsive to their immediate concerns and aspirations.
Such candidates or issues often are not apparent eight to
11 months before a primary. That a citizen should be
absolutely precluded so far in advance from voting in a
party primary in response to a sympathetic candidate,
a new or meaningful issue. or changing party philosophies
in his State. runs contrary to the fundamental rights of
personal choice and expression which voting in this country was designed to serve.
. Whatever state interest exists for preventing crossovers from one party to another is appreciably lessened
where, as in the case of petitioners, there has been no
previous affiliation with any political party. The danger
of voters in sympathy with one party "raiding" another
party is insubstantial where the voter has made no prior
party commitment at all. Certainly, the danger falls
short of the overriding state interest needed to justify
denying petitioners, so far in advance, the right to declare
an initial party affiliation and vote in the party primary
of their choice.

Til
In Dunn, supra, at 343, the Court emphasized that the·
State, in pursuing its legitimate interest,
"cannot choose means which unnecessarily burden or
restrict constitutionally protected activity. Statutes
affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with
'precision' NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 419, 438·
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(1963); United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 265
( 1967), and must be 'tailored' to serve their legitimate objectives. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 394
U. S., at 631. And if there are other, reasonable
ways to achieve these goals with a lessser burden on
constitutionally protected activity, a State may not
choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at
all, it must choose 'less drastic means.' " Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960).
The Court states that placing the enrollment deadline
before the preceding general election serves well the
state interest in discouraging party "raiding." 12 This
fails to address the critical question of whether that interest may be protected adequately by less severe measures.
A foreshortening of the challenged period in this case
would not leave the party structure of New York helpless
and vulnerable to "raiding" activities. Other States, with
varied and complex party systems, have maintained them
successfully without the advanced enrollment deadline
imposed by New York.
Partisan political activities do not constantly engage
the attention of large numbers of Americans, especially
as party labels and loyalties tend to be less persuasive
than issues and the qualities of individual candidates.
The crossover in registration from one party to another
is most often impelled by motives quite unrelated to a
desire to raid or distort a party's primary. To the extent
·t hat deliberate raiding occurs, it is usually the result of
organized effort which depends for its success upon some
relatively immediate concern or interest of the voters.
This type of effort is more likely to occur as a primary
date draws near. If New York were to adopt a more
reasonable enrollment deadline, say 30 to 60 days, the
period most vulnerable to raiding activity would be pro ...
'·

2

C,onr1, opinion, p . 9..
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tected. More importantly, a less drastic enrollment
deadline than the eight or 11 months now imposed by
N e'Y' York would make the franchise and oportunities
for legitimate party participation available to those who
constitutionally have the right to exercise them.13

Petitioners also suggest other "less drast1c" means of protecting
the State's interest: greater reliance on the summary disenrollment
procedures of § 332 of the State's election law and loyalty oaths,
restrictive party affiliation rules optional for those parties who wish
them, limitation of the statute's operation to persons with preexisting party affiliations, and criminal sanctions for fraudulent participation in the electoral process. Tr. of Oral Arg., pp. 13-21. I
make no jt1dgment e1ther on the efficacy of these alternatives in
protectmg the State's interest or on their potential infringement of
constitutionally protected rights. Thmr presence, however, points.
to the range and variety of other experimental techniques available;
(or New York to cons1der..
13

I0
l
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PER CURIAM.

4"

The State of New York provides in its Election Law

IJ

for a closed primary system, in which only duly enrolled
'-.......__.....--

\:;

-...._.. .........

members of a political party may vote in that party's

J

'~

primary election.

~

i

provides that

i

Section 186 of the Election L,w further

a~i~ter~d

voter enrolls i9 a P3littcal

party, he must wait until after the next general blection
I

before he may vote in a primary election. __
!I

Petitioners are

New York residents who registered to vote and enrolled in a

'

::::.

political party in December 1971, one month after a genera}
election.

---------

()

Consequently they are barred by the waiting period
\

of Section 186 from voting in a political primary until after
the November 1972 general election; in particular, they are
barred from voting in the primary scheduled to.

ta~e

place on

June 20, 1972, in which the political parti0s will select,
inter alia, delegates to the national conventions that will
in turn nominate candidates for President and Vice-President
of the United States.Y
Petitioners filed these complaints, ' pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, seeking a declaratory judgment that Section 186 violates

federal constttutional requirements.~__/

The District Court

granted declaratory relief, ___ F.Supp.

(1972), but the

Court of Appeals reversed, __ F.2d ___ (1972) • .!!_/

Because

we regard our recent decision in Dunn v. Blumstein, ,

U.S.

(1972) as controlling, '"e erant certiorari and reverse.
Dunn v. Blrnnstein was not the first case to hold that

-2-
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a compelling state interest and • • • it does so in a manner

7
'

calculated to impinge minimally
Amendment rights."

~First

and Fourteenth

__ Fo2d __ , __ no4.

We cannot agree,

however, that Section 186 satisfies that test.
I

~we

sustained a challenge to a

stat~te

that

prohibited otherwise eligible persons from votinf until they
had been residents of the State for one year and residents of
1

the county for threeill)nths prior to the election.

Recognizing

the State's interest in confining the vote to bona fide residents,
we held that interest could not justify a statute confining the
vote to persons who had been reSdents for the prescribed

1 ()

l
j

narrowly tailored:

l

crude test of bona fide residence.

periods.

The vice of the statute was that it was not

----

l

duration of residence was an impermissibly
Thus the statute denied

recent arrivals the right to vote, even if they were bona

I

fide residents, without any compelling justification for

J

,J

distinguishing them from other bona fide residents.

'l

lj

similar defect.

The New Yo:rk statute at issue here suffers from a

1

:::..

New York argues that it has a valid

interest in confining the right to vote in primary elections

l

to bona fide members of the party in which they vote.

The

State claims the statute is designed to prevent a phenomenon
it describes as "raiding'', whereby voters whose political

(

-,

. ..
I

loyalty is to one party fraudulently designate themselves
as members of another party, in order to influence the
results of thei.r adversary's primary.

The Court of Appeals

-3-
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·o
in accordance with their bona fide party loyalties;
accordingly, the statute puts the would-be raid e r "in the
unseemly position of asking to be enrolled in one party
while at the same time in·tending to vote immediately for
another."

j

F.2d. at

•

We assume for purposes of this case th~t

I

thF

State has

a legitimate interest in restricting the prLmary\ vote to

'

bona fide members of the party in which they vote. Moreover,

1

we recognize that Section 186 may have some tendency to

I

promote that interest.

.

waiting period of Section 186, like the durational residence

j

(

Nevertheless, it is clear that the

requirement in Dunn, is not narrowly tailored to promote
'.'

that objective.
This case does not present the question whether a
State may impose such a waiting period on voters who

,..

change their allegiance from one party to another.

l
l.

-----

Lippett v. Cipollone, ___ U.S. ___

...-

(1972).~/

Cf.

New York has

not confined its restriction to that group, and petitioners
do not fall in that class.

I----

{

The waiting period of Ses.tion
.r

...,-=;

-

186 is triggered by first-time enrollment in a political

I

I

i

party, and not by past membership in another parqy.

!

1

It

applies to petitioners and their class, who have never before

i

'l

registered to vote or enrolled in any political party, and it

J

also applies to new residents of the State of New York, who

!
'

(

may enroll in a political party in order to continue a party
affiliation of many years' duration.i_!

•

In such cases, the

mere fact thct party enrdJJent .is _recert casts no special doubt
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We agree with the District Court's conclusion that
Section 186 fails to satisfy constitutional requirements.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to
reinstate the judgment of the District Court.

f
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' I § 186, Ope ning of enrollment box and completion of
enrolli1ient. All enrollment blanks contained in the enrollment
box shall remain in such box, and the box shall not be opened
nor shall any of the blanks be removed therefrom until the
Tuesday following the day of general election in that year.
Such box shall then be opened by the board of ' elections and the
blanks contained therein shall be removed therefrom by the
board, and the names of the party designated by ~ach voter
under such declaration, provided such party cont'nues to be a
party, as defined in this law shall be entered b the board,
opposite the name of such voter in the appropria e column of
the two copies of the register containing enrollment numbers for
the election district in which such voter resides • • • •
Section 187 exempts certain classes of voters from the
waiting period of Section 186. These exceptions include
persons who have moved from one place to another within a
single county, and persons who attained voting age after the
last general election. Petitioners do not fall within any of
the excepted classes.

_3_! The individual petitioners had each attained voting age
shor :t1Y before·tl:e last general election, and hence were eligible
to register and enroll in a political party in time to permit
them to vote in the June 1972 primary election. (Had they
attained voting age after the general election, they would be
eligible for late party enrollment pursuant to ~ 187,
see note __ suprao) Having failed to do so, whether through
inadvertence, lack of interest in the essentially local
1971 election, or for other reasons, they sought to participate
in the first Presidential primary and election for which they
were eligible. We agree with the District Court that this
sequenc~ of events cannot be treated ~s a waiver of the right
to vote, see ___ F.Supp. at ___ •
~/ The cases originated in two complaints, which were
consolidated by the district court. One of the complaints
(that of petitioner Rosario) stated a cause of action on behalf
of a class, as well as on behalf of the named plaintiffs, and
the district judge treated the case as a class action. PetitioneJ
originally sougl1t injunctive as well as declaratory relief, but
they abandoned their request for injunctive relief; accordingly
the case was not required to be heard by a three-judge court
under 28 U.S.C. § 2281. ,t.c...,.,d'1 v . Mt ... ..lv)'\-H .. ..-t . ..,c~, 17~ 1.-f . .>. J'fLI) ~~;:!,·5"~('-,

jl/ The Court of Appeals denied rehearing en bane,
Judges Feinberg and Oakes dissenting.
::__; Li:ppett involved a state statute that imposed a
waiting period on would-be candidates for office who changed
their Allegiance from one party to another. xx vle sumrnari ly

,
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the party enrollment: of a voter may be challenged by any fellow
party member and cancelled by a Justice of the State Supreme
Court upon the determination of the Chairman of the County C
~
Committee of the party in the county in which the challenged vot e~
is enrolled that the vo ·t er is not in sympathy with the principles ·
of the party. This provision has been successfully invoked on
several occasions, see Matter of Zuckman v. Donohue, 191 Misc.
399, 79 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Sup.Ct.), aff'd 274 A.D. 216, 80 N.Y.S.2d
698, aff'd 298 N.Y. 627, 81 N.E.2d 371, 86 N.Y.S.2d
(1948);
Matter of He rbel v. Gernstein, 191 Misc. 274, 78 N.Y:5:"2d 440
(S1.1p.Ct. 19LJ.8); ~1atter of Newkirk, 144 Misc. 765,· 259 N.Y.S.
434 (Sup.Ct. 1931).
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An Unusual Foursome
" ..

For the ·, first time since he
· went on the Supreme Court 15
months ago, Richmonder Lewis
F. Powell Jr. has written an
opinion in which he has been
joined by the three staunch liberals ·on the court but by none of
the other conservatives.
Powell and Justices Douglas,
Brennan and Marshall dissented
last week from a ruling uphold·
ing a New York law which re·
.quires a voter to enroll in the
party of his choice at least 30
days before the general election
in order to vote in the next party
primary. Under the law, the cutoff date for enrollment occurs
' about eight months before a
, presidential primary and 11
months before a nonpresidential

.

·,r ,

week~." On the other hand, arter

the general election, and close to
the time of the primary, voters
might be inclined to cross over
and try to upset the primary of
the party they really don't favor,
according to the ~ajority's opinion.
But Powell and the three liberals saw it differe~tly.
."Deferment of a right, especially one as sensitive and essential as the exercise of the first
duty of citizen~hip, can be tantamount to its denial," wrote
Powell. "And any statute which
imposes for eight or 11 months
an absolute freeze on party enrollment and the consequent
r i g h t to vote totally disenfranchises a class of persons
who, for quite legitimate reasons, decide to .register closer
than eight months to the primary
date and those WhO, for equally
I e g i t i m a t e reasons, wish to
choose or alter party affiliation.''
Virginia does not have voter
enrollment by parties, so the
New York opinion has no direct
application here, and we have no
strong feelings as to the rightness or wrongness of the decision. But Powell did make one
important point, and that is that
many people switch parties because of the individual candidates involved, rather than party
principles, .and that candidatesand issues, too - "often are not
apparent eight to 11 months before a primary."

Powell
,
The three other Nixon appointees - Burger, Blackmun
and Rehnquist - and Stewart
and White held that New York
had a valid reason for requiring
party enrollment prior to .a genThe signficant fact about this
eral election in order to::i9hibit case, at least as far as Virginia
party "raiding." In "raiding," is concerned, is not the court's
the court explained, "voters in finding but, rather, the fact that
sympathy with one party desig- conservative Powell lined up
nate themselves as voters of an- with the court's three all-out lib' other party so as to influence or erals. In his career as a Supreme ·
determine the results of the other Court justice, Powell obviously is
party's primary."
not going to be doctrinaire; he is
T h e majority quoted, ap- not going to have a · knee-jerk
provingly, a lower court opinion 'conservative reaction to issues
' which said that "few persons before the court. The evidence is
have the effrontery or the fore- that he is following the policy of
sight to enroll as, say, Republi- attempting to decide issues solecans so that they can vote in a ly on the basis of the law and the
primary some seven months Constitution. And nothing more
hence, when they full well intend could be asked of any person octo vote Democratic in only a few cupying a judicial bench.
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